Why do infants imitate selectively? Neural correlates of infants’ action understanding in the head-touch

paradigm by Langeloh, Miriam
  
 
 
 
Doctoral thesis submitted to 
the Faculty of Behavioural and Cultural Studies 
Heidelberg University  
 in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy (Dr. phil.) 
in Psychology 
 
 
 
 
 
Title of the publication-based thesis 
Why do infants imitate selectively?  
Neural correlates of infants’ action understanding in the head-touch 
paradigm 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
presented by  
Miriam Langeloh 
 
 
year of submission 
2019 
 
 
 
 
Dean: Prof. Dr. Dirk Hagemann 
Advisors: Prof. Dr. Stefanie Hoehl 
 Prof. Dr. Sabina Pauen 
 
 
 
  2 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I am deeply grateful to everyone who guided and accompanied me throughout my 
PhD journey.  
 
First of all, I would like to thank Prof. Stefanie Hoehl. Dear Steffi, thank you so much 
for your support and your trust. Thank you for giving me the freedom to conduct the 
research that I was interested in. Working and discussing research with you has 
always been a great pleasure, from the first day of my master’s studies onwards. In 
addition, thank you for inviting me to come to Leipzig to the MPI CBS with you. I 
cannot put in words how much I have learned during this time and how much I have 
grown as a researcher. Thank you!  
 
Furthermore, I would like to thank Prof. Sabina Pauen. Dear Sabina, thank you so 
much for believing in me and, above all, for telling me. Thank you for fruitful 
discussions on the most exciting topics – infants & brains, of course. Beyond that, I 
would like to thank you for your advice – be it professional or personal. Thank you so 
much! 
 
I would also like to thank Prof. Daniel Haun for being such a helpful TAC advisor at 
IMPRS. Thank you for your interest in my research and especially for taking so much 
time to discuss it with me.  
 
Many thanks go to my co-authors Stefanie Hoehl, Sabina Pauen, David Buttelmann, 
Daniel Matthes, and Susanne Grassmann. Working with you was fun and very 
productive.  
 
A special thanks goes to the IMPRS on Neuroscience of Communication. Thank you 
for offering me the opportunity to participate in your excellent seminars and 
workshops and for the financial support.  
 
In addition, I would like to thank the secretaries, MTAs, PsTAs, and student 
assistants for their help in recruiting and testing babies. A special thanks goes to 
  3 
Christiane Fauth-Scheurich at Heidelberg University. Thank you for always being 
there for me. Moreover, I am grateful to the video models of my stimuli Janina, Linda, 
Alex, Jana, Philipp, and Maxi. Of course, I would also like to thank all parents and 
infants for participating in my studies.  
 
Furthermore, I would like to thank my colleagues and friends, I have worked with 
during the journey of my PhD. Thank you so much Heidelberg colleagues for making 
work feel like home. Christine, thank you from the bottom of my heart for sharing your 
knowledge on EEG with me and helping me to set up my first study. Thank you for 
always listening and growing together. Steffi P., you are such a lovely friend and an 
impressive researcher. Thank you so much for your help and advice and for sharing 
your excitement about research with me. Hanna, it was a pleasure going through the 
ups and downs of PhD life in an office together with you! Thanks for always being 
honest with me and bringing lots of Schabernack into my life. Thank you, Ezgi, for 
believing in me – that was highly encouraging! Thank you, Daniel, for your positive 
attitude, the fun lunches and, of course, the programming.  
 
I would like to extend my thanks to all of my friends. Thank you for your endless 
support. A special thanks goes to my best friend, Aliner. Thank you for listening to 
me no matter what time and day. Thanks for cheering me up and sending me 
extraordinarily motivating postcards and gift boxes. You are the best! Furthermore, I 
would like to thank Susan. Thank you so much for always being there for me – be it 
for discussing research or any other topic. You are my person (for anyone who hasn’t 
watched Grey’s anatomy – that means a lot)! Nadene, Lena, & Charlotte, meeting 
you here in Leipzig was the greatest gift! Thank you for your emotional and research 
support. Thank you for fun lunches and girls (or mixed) nights. Charlotte & Robert, 
you have been like a family to me in Leipzig. Thanks for always making me feel 
welcome and for all the unforgettable moments we have had together. I would also 
like to thank the most glorious tennis team: Thank you 3. Damen LTC for distracting 
me with the most fun thing on this planet – TENNIS! Thank you for listening and 
caring so much, also off-court. #MORETHANATEAM 
 
  4 
Finally, I would like to thank my family. Mami, it is difficult to put in words how grateful 
I am to you. Seeing how proud you are of me and how much you love me has always 
given me the strength to continue this journey. Thank you for your calls and 
postcards and for never giving up on me. Papi, I am deeply thankful to you for being 
there for me. You have always been a great example for me and I am so grateful and 
happy to have you in my life. Of course, I would also like to thank my kind (and also 
sometimes a bit crazy :D) brothers, Jonas and David, and my lovely sister, Diane, for 
making my life joyful and for accepting that I always had to ‘get back to work’ (that is 
over – for now ;)).  
 
Last but not least, I would like to thank Philipp. Thank you for sticking with me – no 
matter what. Thank you for moving to Leipzig with me so that I can pursue my 
dreams. Meeting you at the beginning of this journey was the best thing that has ever 
happened to me. You are the most amazing person and having you in my life is 
better than anything I could have ever hoped for. Ich danke dir von tiefem Herzen!  
 
  5 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................ 2 
Table of contents .................................................................................................................... 5 
List of scientific publications for the publication-based thesis.................................................. 6 
1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 7 
2. What is selective imitation? ................................................................................................ 9 
3. Why do infants imitate selectively? Recent explanatory accounts..................................... 12 
3.1 Rational-imitation accounts ......................................................................................... 12 
3.2 Non-rational imitation accounts ................................................................................... 13 
3.3 Empirical evidence for the mechanisms of infants’ action perception beyond selective 
imitation ............................................................................................................................ 14 
3.4 Integrative model & aim of the current thesis .............................................................. 18 
4. Exploring infants’ neural correlates of action understanding in the head-touch paradigm . 22 
4.1 Study 1 – Motor system activation during action evaluation ........................................ 24 
4.2 Study 2 – ERP evidence from the head-touch paradigm ............................................. 26 
4.3 Study 3 – The role of context information during action evaluation ............................. 29 
5. General Discussion .......................................................................................................... 31 
5.1 Critical reflection on the results in the light of current theories on infants’ action 
understanding ................................................................................................................... 33 
5.2 Future perspectives .................................................................................................... 39 
6. Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 43 
7. References ....................................................................................................................... 44 
List of figures ........................................................................................................................ 57 
Declaration in accordance to § 8 (1) c) and d) of the doctoral degree regulation of the Faculty
 ............................................................................................................................................. 58 
Scientific publications for the publication-based thesis ......................................................... 59 
 
  6 
LIST OF SCIENTIFIC PUBLICATIONS FOR THE PUBLICATION-BASED 
THESIS 
 
 
I. Manuscript 
Langeloh, M., Buttelmann, D., Matthes, D., Grassmann, S., Pauen, S., & Hoehl, S. 
(2018). Reduced mu power in response to unusual actions is context-dependent in 1-
year-olds. Front Psychol, 9, 36. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00036 
 
 
II. Manuscript 
Langeloh, M., Buttelmann, D., Pauen, S., & Hoehl, S. (2019). 12- to 14-month-olds 
expect unconstrained agents to act efficiently: ERP evidence from the head-touch 
paradigm. Manuscript under review in Developmental Psychology. 
 
 
III. Manuscript 
Langeloh, M., Pauen, S., Buttelmann, D., Hoehl, S. (2019). One-year-olds’ event-
related potentials differentiate expected from unexpected action outcomes without 
context information. Manuscript under review in Infancy. 
 
  7 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 Suppose you come home with your hands full of groceries, pushing the front 
door open with your shoulder. Your 1-year-old daughter stands before you and 
watches you closely. What would she do after you entered? Perhaps she would close 
the door with her hands, as usual. Would you expect a different behavior if you were 
being silly, pushing the front door open with your shoulder, even though your hands 
had been free? Indeed, research suggests that in this case, your daughter might take 
up the game and imitate your unusual action, opening or closing the door with her 
shoulder (Gergely, Bekkering, & Király, 2002). Infants watch their parents performing 
actions that are more or less familiar every day. What factors determine whether the 
infant copies your exact action, or instead performs a more efficient action that leads 
to the same goal as your original action? 
 The first years of life are a period of intense learning in which infants rapidly 
acquire social and physical skills to navigate through our complex world successfully. 
Infants can learn tremendously from observing their environment and the people 
acting in it, as well as from interacting with the environment themselves. Within these 
interactions, infants’ early socio-cognitive skills are trained. A vital skill is to 
understand others’ actions as being goal-directed. Action understanding enables 
infants to predict and interpret others’ behavior and to react accordingly (Csibra & 
Gergely, 2007; Gredebäck & Daum, 2015). It is at the core of social cognition and a 
precursor to the development of theory of mind, the ability to attribute mental states 
to oneself and others (e.g., Aschersleben, Hofer, & Jovanovic, 2008; Filippi, Choi, 
Fox, & Woodward, 2019). 
 Infants can increase their knowledge of others’ and their own goal-directed 
actions by observing and imitating others. Imitation, that is copying a behavior that 
another person has previously demonstrated, is one of the first forms of cultural 
learning and an important social learning mechanism (Jones, 2009; Paulus, 2011; 
Tomasello, 1999). However, infants do not blindly imitate every action they observe. 
The central question for the infant still remains of which actions she should attend to 
and imitate and which ones she can ignore. 
 Let us return to the example of opening a door and say your infant imitates the 
unusual action. She opens the door with her shoulder after watching you doing this 
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with your hands being free. The following question immediately arises: why does 
your infant selectively imitate this unusual action, that is, why does she alter her 
actions depending on whether or not your hands were free? 
 Examining situations in which infants selectively imitate actions provides a 
useful research approach to gain insights in their understanding of others’ goal-
directed actions. Based on these research findings, we can evoke and adequately 
foster the ideal observational learning processes. So far, scientists conducting 
behavioral research have proposed contrasting theoretical accounts, which aim to 
tackle the underlying mechanisms of selective imitation. One account suggests that 
infants selectively imitate unusual actions because they are surprised by the 
inefficiency of the action and want to figure out the reason why an actor would 
possibly behave that way (Gergely et al., 2002; Gergely & Csibra, 2003). In contrast, 
it has been proposed that when the infant’s body posture is highly similar to the 
observed position of the adult, an automatic motor program is activated. This leads to 
imitation because action execution and observation are linked (Paulus, Hunnius, 
Vissers, & Bekkering, 2011a, 2011b).  
 Despite the large body of behavioral research on selective imitation, the 
question of what are the neural mechanisms underlying these processes remains 
unanswered. What happens in infants’ brains when they observe actions that elicit 
selective imitation? In my dissertation, I will present three studies investigating the 
cognitive processes involved in infants’ action understanding in an adaptation of a 
widely applied behavioral paradigm. In the first part, I will give a short introduction to 
selective imitation and how it has been measured so far. I will then introduce two 
contradicting theoretical explanatory accounts, and a more recent integrative 
approach combining both accounts (Zmyj & Buttelmann, 2014). I aim to add the 
underlying cognitive processes to this recent integrative model. To this end, I 
conducted three empirical studies to test the neural indices of infants’ action 
understanding. I will summarize these studies and finally, I will discuss the findings in 
the light of current theories on infants’ action understanding and propose directions 
for future research.  
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2. WHAT IS SELECTIVE IMITATION?  
 As mentioned in the Introduction, imitation is a social learning mechanism to 
transfer information between individuals, evident already in infancy (Jones, 2009). To 
date, various definitions of imitation have been brought forward. In line with Paulus 
(2011), I distinguish between behavior-based definitions and intention-based 
definitions. Behavior-based definitions of imitation refer to “copying by an observer of 
a feature of the body movement of a model” (Heyes, 2001; p. 254). This does not 
apply if an action co-occurs by chance or if the action effect is not specific to the 
executed action (Heyes, 2001; Jones, 2007; Paulus, 2011). Intention-based 
definitions, on the other hand, claim that imitative learning only comprises situations 
in which someone recognizes and intentionally reproduces an intended human 
action. Accordingly, imitation needs to be differentiated from stimulus enhancement, 
i.e. attention being drawn to the relevant object, and emulation, i.e. copying the end-
state only independent of the action means (Tomasello, 1999; Tomasello & 
Carpenter, 2005; Want & Harris, 2002; Whiten, Horner, & Litchfield, 2004; Whiten, 
McGuigan, Marshall-Pescini, & Hopper, 2009). Thus, behavior-based definitions, in 
contrast to intention-based definitions, do not judge or specify the underlying 
mechanisms and leave the investigation of the exact mechanisms open for research 
(Paulus, 2011). In my thesis I apply a behavior-based definition, defining imitation as 
copying an action that has previously been demonstrated by another person, not 
requiring intentional processes.  
 Coming back to infants – what kind of actions do they imitate and what can we 
conclude from that as developmental scientists? Meltzoff (1995) has demonstrated 
that 18-month-old infants imitated an intended action goal after observing a failed 
attempt of an adult model to perform such an action. For instance, infants 
successfully pulled apart two pieces of a dumbbell, even though the adult 
demonstrator failed to separate the two pieces (not, however, when they observed 
the action attempts of a non-human mechanical device). Similarly, 14- to 18-month-
olds were more likely to imitate transitive actions, if an adult model commented them 
with “there” compared to “whoops” (Carpenter, Akhtar, & Tomasello, 1998). One 
interpretation of these findings is that infants imitate selectively depending on the 
intention of the model (for alternative interpretations, see Heyes, 2001; Jones, 2009).  
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 Irrespective of the interpretation, these two examples show that from the age 
of 14 months onwards infants do not just blindly imitate every action they see – they 
imitate selectively. Beyond intentions (Buttelmann, Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 
2008; Carpenter et al., 1998), infants’ selective imitation depends on characteristics 
of the model such as age (Zmyj, Aschersleben, Prinz, & Daum, 2012), reliability 
(Zmyj, Buttelmann, Carpenter, & Daum, 2010), group membership (Buttelmann, 
Zmyj, Daum, & Carpenter, 2013), and ostensive communication (Király, Csibra, & 
Gergely, 2013). In addition, external factors such as the necessity of a performed 
action (Nielsen, 2006) and the context or the constraints of a given situation (Gergely 
et al., 2002) influence infants’ selective imitation. In particular, the effects of 
situational constraints on infants’ selective imitation have led to a lively debate in 
cognitive developmental psychology (Paulus, 2012b; Zmyj & Buttelmann, 2014). 
Selective imitation which is dependent on the action context has mainly been tested 
with the well-known behavioral head-touch paradigm (Gergely et al., 2002). In the 
following section, I will elaborate on the head-touch paradigm, which I have adapted 
in my thesis to study neural indices of infants’ action understanding (see Chapter 4).  
 In the seminal study by Gergely et al. (2002), 14-month-old infants observed 
an adult model turning on a lamp with her head (head touch) within two different 
action contexts. One group of infants watched the unusual action while the model’s 
hands were free (hands-free condition), similar to the original setting by Meltzoff 
(1988). The second group of infants watched the same unusual action while the 
model’s hands were occupied with a blanket (hands-occupied condition). One week 
later, infants were given the opportunity to play with the lamp themselves. Results 
revealed that infants imitated the unusual head-touch action more often in the hands-
free (69 %) than in the hands-occupied condition (21 %). Thus, 14-month-olds 
selectively1 imitated an unusual and inefficient action whenever the model had no 
discernible reason to perform the action in such a manner. Copying an inefficient 
action seems to be paradoxical at first sight and, therefore, caught the attention of 
many researchers.  
                                            
1 Please note that in the literature this phenomenon is often termed rational imitation. However, I will 
refer to it as selective imitation to avoid any judgment about the underlying mechanisms.  
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 Since the original demonstration, this finding has been replicated multiple 
times with similar paradigms (Gellén & Buttelmann, 2017; Schwier, von Maanen, 
Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2006), younger age groups (Zmyj, Daum, & Aschersleben, 
2009), humans’ closest relatives, chimpanzees (Buttelmann, Carpenter, Call, & 
Tomasello, 2007), and even dogs (Range, Viranyi, & Huber, 2007) (but for an 
alternative explanation in dogs, see Kaminski et al., 2011). For instance, Zmyj et al. 
(2009) added a novel condition to the head-touch paradigm, in which the model’s 
hands were involuntarily restrained by being tied to table (hands-restrained 
condition). Twelve-month-old infants imitated the unusual head touch significantly 
more often in the hands-free (75 %) compared to the hands-restrained (25 %) but not 
to the hands-occupied condition (50 %). Thus, past research suggests that selective 
imitation of unusual actions with varying situational constraints develops around the 
age of 12 months for explicit, involuntary constraints (e.g., hands are restrained by 
duct tape; Zmyj et al., 2009) and at the age of 14 months for voluntary, implicit 
constraints (e.g., holding a blanket; Gergely et al., 2002).  
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3. WHY DO INFANTS IMITATE SELECTIVELY? RECENT 
EXPLANATORY ACCOUNTS 
 In the literature there is consensus concerning the existence of selective 
imitation. However, explanations differ with regard to the level of cognitive abilities 
considered requisite for selective imitation and underlying mechanisms. In the 
following section, I will review the two current explanations of selective imitation in 
the head-touch paradigm: rational- and non-rational imitation accounts.  
 
3.1 RATIONAL-IMITATION ACCOUNTS 
 Proponents of the rational-imitation accounts claim that selective imitation 
occurs as a result of an infant’s efficiency evaluation of an action within a specific 
action context (Buttelmann et al., 2008; Gergely et al., 2002). By applying the 
principle of rational action, infants can relate and evaluate three aspects of reality in 
terms of another person’s goal-directed action: situational constraints (here: hands 
free or occupied), goal states (here: turn on the light), and action means (here: head 
touch). When given information about any two of these three elements, infants can 
predict the third aspect based on the assumption that agents execute actions with the 
most efficient means available (Gergely & Csibra, 2003). Consequently, whether 
infants imitate a demonstrated action or not depends on infants’ rational evaluation of 
the model’s behavior. When the model’s hands were occupied, infants interpreted the 
head touch as being the most efficient means to turn on the lamp. This implies that 
the model would have used her hands if that had been possible. As infants did not 
share this situational constraint, they predominantly used their hands to illuminate the 
lamp. However, when the model’s hands were free while she turned on the lamp with 
her head, infants were surprised and might have surmised that the unusual head 
touch offers some advantage or a learning opportunity (Gergely et al., 2002; Király & 
Oláh, 2018). Thus, infants may have inferred that the head touch is the most efficient 
means in this situation, which led to selective imitation of the respective action.  
 This theory does not necessarily require infants to ascribe intentions to the 
model during action evaluation (Gergely & Csibra, 2003). The teleological stance 
posits that infants interpret actions as goal-directed and evaluate their efficiency 
based on the principle of rational action. However, the principle of rational action can 
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also be applied to a mentalistic stance, that is, selective imitation is guided by the 
contents of a model’s mental state. In this view, infants were more likely to imitate the 
unusual head touch in order to figure out the reason why the model acted in this 
peculiar way (Buttelmann et al., 2008).  
 Note that researchers have recently combined the theory of rational action 
with the theory of natural pedagogy (Csibra & Gergely, 2009; Gergely & Jacob, 
2012). In this tenet, infants are prepared to acquire novel or arbitrary actions by 
relying on others’ communicative signals (e.g., eye contact). They expect a 
communicative agent to demonstrate relevant and novel information which should be 
reproduced (Gergely & Jacob, 2012). When infants observe a goal-directed action 
that cannot be explained by the principle of rational action and is accompanied by 
communicative cues, infants may assume that this arbitrary action is a subgoal of a 
higher-order goal. Rationality is adjusted to the subgoal such that infants may 
conclude that the goal is to touch the lamp with the forehead (Király et al., 2013). 
 To sum up, according to rational-imitation accounts, infants hold expectations 
of future actions and these expectations are violated when observing inefficient 
action outcomes. The violation of expectation (VOE) could result in increased 
imitation of the observed unusual action either because infants assume this action to 
have an advantage and be the most efficient means (teleological) or because they 
want to learn the reason why the model performed this action (mentalistic).  
 
3.2 NON-RATIONAL IMITATION ACCOUNTS 
 In contrast, two non-rational imitation accounts have been brought forward, 
which relate infants’ selective imitation to more basic, low-level processes, such as 
motor resonance or attention (Beisert et al., 2012; Paulus, Hunnius, et al., 2011a, 
2011b). Supporters of the motor resonance account, also called the two-stage model, 
claim that two factors guide infants’ imitation: first, action observation and action 
execution are automatically linked via simulation processes (i.e., motor resonance). 
Infants are more likely to imitate actions that are already represented in their own 
motor repertoire and elicit high motor resonance (Paulus, Hunnius, & Bekkering, 
2013b; Paulus, Hunnius, et al., 2011a, 2011b). Second, salient action effects 
influence infants’ imitative behavior (Elsner & Aschersleben, 2003; Hommel, 
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Muesseler, Aschersleben, & Prinz, 2001). The two-stage model can also explain why 
infants would imitate the head touch more frequently in the hands-free condition. At 
12- to 14-months of age, infants need to physically support themselves by putting 
their hands on the table next to the lamp in order to touch the lamp with their head. 
This is similar to the adult model in the hands-free but not in the hands-occupied 
condition, which therefore elicits more motor resonance in the hands-free condition.  
 The alternative low-level perceptual-distraction account (Beisert et al., 2012) 
states that selective imitation occurs because of differences in attention. Infants may 
have been distracted by the unfamiliar look of the blanket being wrapped around the 
model’s torso and, thus, imitated the head touch less frequently in the hands-
occupied condition (Beisert et al., 2012). However, recent eye-tracking findings 
challenge this view, for instance, because 14-month-olds and adults did not differ in 
their amount of time spent looking at the model’s head or torso between the hands-
free and hands-occupied condition (Buttelmann, Schieler, Wetzel, & Widmann, 2017; 
Elsner, Pfeifer, Parker, & Hauf, 2013; Kolling, Óturai, & Knopf, 2014).  
 To summarize, the two-stage model and the perceptual-distraction account 
assume that differences in imitation frequency can be explained by differences in 
motor resonance or attention. Thus, non-rational imitation accounts2 depart from 
rational-imitation accounts in that they do not make any claims about infants’ action 
expectations. However, in this thesis, I aim to investigate the neural underpinnings of 
infants’ action evaluations based on the principle of rational action. Hence, non-
rational imitation accounts are not tested directly in this dissertation, but need to be 
considered for a broader interpretation of the results. 
 
3.3 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FOR THE MECHANISMS OF INFANTS’ 
ACTION PERCEPTION BEYOND SELECTIVE IMITATION  
 Interestingly, infants’ selective imitation behavior informs us about infants’ 
underlying action perception and action understanding. Action perception is an 
umbrella term which encompasses the mechanisms taking place during the 
                                            
2 From now on, when I use the term non-rational imitation accounts, I only refer to the two-stage model 
as the perceptual-distraction account has recently been challenged by several eye-tracking 
experiments (e.g., Buttelmann et al., 2017).  
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processing and perception of actions. These mechanisms range from a basic 
sensory perception to an in-depth action understanding. Note that distinct aspects, 
which occur in sequence, are subsumed under the generic term action understanding 
(Figure 1; Gredebäck & Daum, 2015). First of all, infants need to identify an agent.  
Second, infants have to allocate covert attention to the future state of the agent 
(priming; e.g., Wronski & Daum, 2014) and can then predict action outcomes 
(prediction; e.g., Falck-Ytter, Gredebäck, & von Hofsten, 2006). Finally, after an 
action goal is achieved, infants can evaluate action outcomes (evaluation; e.g., Reid 
et al., 2009). In the current thesis, I examine the cognitive mechanisms underlying 
action evaluation based on predictions of the principle of rational action (Gergely & 
Csibra, 2003). As mentioned above, action evaluation can be assessed by overt 
imitative responses. Yet, action evaluation can as well be measured by infants’ 
implicit reactions to action outcomes, that is, by looking times, pupil diameters and 
neural activity in the electroencephalogram (EEG).  
 
 
Figure 1. Timeline of action perception adapted from Gredebäck & Daum (2015). The 
underlying processes of action evaluation are assessed in the studies of this thesis.  
 
 Csibra and Gergely (2007) have posited three cognitive mechanisms of action 
evaluation or goal attribution (i.e., why an action is performed) in infancy, which are 
highly comparable to the mechanisms suggested by rational- and non-rational 
imitation accounts: action-effect associations, simulation procedures, and teleological 
reasoning. Rational-imitation accounts mainly refer to teleological reasoning, 
whereas non-rational imitation accounts rather consider action-effect associations 
and simulation procedures. Consequently, I propose that experimental evidence for 
the underlying mechanisms of action evaluation can also be interpreted in favor of 
the rational- or non-rational imitation accounts respectively. In the following section, I 
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will review developmental research on infants’ action perception, focusing on action 
evaluation in particular. With this overview I would like to emphasize that the debate 
in developmental psychology about the level of infants’ cognitive abilities goes 
beyond the topic of selective imitation in the head-touch paradigm. The framework on 
the cognitive mechanisms of goal attribution (Csibra & Gergely, 2007) allows for a 
more general examination and discussion of the current results with regard to action 
perception (see Chapter 5). 
 On the one hand, there is evidence that teleological reasoning underlies 
infants’ action perception, in line with the rational-imitation accounts. The basic 
component of teleological reasoning, interpreting others’ actions as goal-directed, 
has been shown in infants as young as 6 months. In her seminal paradigm, 
Woodward (1998) habituated infants to a hand grasping one of two toys. The location 
was switched in the test phase and infants looked longer (dishabituated), indicating 
expectancy violation, at the scenario where the hand grasped the new toy at the old 
location (for an alternative interpretation, see Ganglmayer, Attig, Daum, & Paulus, 
2019). 
 Furthermore, there is evidence for the second component of teleological 
reasoning, that is, infants applying the principle of rational action to human (Sodian, 
Schoeppner, & Metz, 2004) and non-human agents (Csibra, Bìró, Koós, & Gergely, 
2003; Gergely, Nádasdy, Csibra, & Bíró, 1995). For instance, 9-months-old infants 
expected a circular object to take a direct, efficient path, rather than an indirect, 
inefficient path, when moving to a goal location (Csibra, Gergely, Bíró, Koós, & 
Brockbank, 1999). Further support for infants predicting and evaluating action 
outcomes based on the principle of rational action comes from studies with familiar 
everyday life actions. While observing inefficient feeding actions (i.e., food is placed 
on someone’s back of the hand rather than into the mouth), 6- and 12-month-olds’ 
pupils dilated, suggesting increased arousal and possibly VOE (Gredebäck & 
Melinder, 2010). When using more explicit, external constraints, even 4-month-olds’ 
pupils dilated towards inefficient eating actions (Gredebäck & Melinder, 2011). 
Importantly, these reactions to inefficient outcomes are not just responses to novelty 
but indicate teleological evaluations as only the action context (i.e., an obstacle being 
present or not) was manipulated. In addition, infants anticipate and, thus, expect that 
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adults use familiar objects efficiently (e.g., putting a phone to the ear but not to the 
head). Infants fixated the efficient action goal even before the action outcome was 
achieved, measured by infants’ anticipatory gaze shifts, by the age of 6 months (for 
objects) and 12 months (for feeding actions; Gredebäck & Melinder, 2010; Hunnius & 
Bekkering, 2010).  
 Similarly, studies employing neuroscientific methods, such as the EEG, have 
shown that infants anticipate and evaluate eating and drinking actions. When 9-
month-olds observed unexpected action outcomes (e.g., a pretzel put to the head 
instead of to the mouth), their brains responded with an N400 component, reflecting 
the detection of violations of semantic action contexts (Kaduk et al., 2016; Reid et al., 
2009). Furthermore, Stapel, Hunnius, van Elk, and Bekkering (2010) found stronger 
mu desynchronization, associated with motor activation, during the observation of 
unexpected object-directed actions in 12-month-olds (for more details on these 
findings, see Study 1 & Study 2 in Chapter 4).  
 To summarize, the presented studies are based on the idea that infants hold 
expectations about how other people should perform specific actions, i.e., in the most 
efficient manner. If this expectation is violated, infants respond with longer looking 
times, dilated pupils, increased negativity in their event-related potentials (ERPs) or 
with stronger mu desynchronization.  
 On the other hand, there is evidence suggesting that action-effect associations 
and simulation procedures underlie infants’ action perception, as proposed by the 
non-rational imitation accounts (Paulus, Hunnius, et al., 2011a, 2011b). Motor 
resonance and, thus, motor abilities, experiences and action effects seem to 
influence how infants perceive others’ actions (for a review on how experience 
shapes infants' action understanding, see Hunnius & Bekkering, 2014). Behavioral 
research has shown that infants are more likely to imitate actions producing action 
effects (for a review on action-effect learning, see Elsner, 2007; Hauf, 2007). In 
addition, Paulus et al. (2013b) found in an observational training study that 9-month-
olds represent the effects of others’ actions in their own motor repertoire. That is, 
infants’ brains responded with stronger mu desynchronization, indicating motor 
activation, to the sound of a rattle they had been trained with before compared to an 
unfamiliar rattle sound. Consequently, infants acquired action-effect associations 
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through observational learning but also through own experience. After being trained 
to shake the rattle themselves, 8-month-olds’ brains also responded with stronger mu 
desynchronization when listening to the learned rattle sound compared to a novel 
sound (Paulus, Hunnius, van Elk, & Bekkering, 2012).  
 Further EEG studies have demonstrated that the observation of actions that 
are already in the infants’ motor repertoire leads to a stronger activation of the motor 
system (Reid, Striano, & Iacoboni, 2011; van Elk, van Schie, Hunnius, Vesper, & 
Bekkering, 2008). For instance, 14- to 16-month-olds showed stronger mu 
desynchronization towards videos of a crawling compared to a walking infant. EEG 
findings were closely related to infants’ own crawling experience (van Elk et al., 
2008). Similarly, in eye-tracking studies, 12-month-olds only predicted human agents’ 
goal states when they were already able to perform the action themselves. No 
proactive eye movements were found for mechanical motions (Falck-Ytter et al., 
2006; Sommerville & Woodward, 2005; Sommerville, Woodward, & Needham, 2005).  
 To sum up, according to this line of research, infants’ understanding of others’ 
actions is shaped by motor abilities and action effects rather than by expectations 
based on rationality. Taken together, the empirical findings outlined in this chapter 
suggest that both mechanisms, proposed by the rational- and non-rational imitation 
accounts, can be supported by current developmental research on infants’ action 
perception and understanding.  
 
3.4 INTEGRATIVE MODEL & AIM OF THE CURRENT THESIS  
 This short excursus on infants’ action perception and understanding has 
demonstrated evidence for the underlying mechanisms suggested by both rational- 
and non-rational imitation accounts (i.e., rational evaluation and motor resonance 
combined with action effects). In my view, each account in itself cannot 
comprehensively explain why infants may have imitated selectively in the head-touch 
paradigm. 
 In particular, rational-imitation accounts fail to explain how an observed 
behavior is transformed into a motor command in the first place (Zmyj & Buttelmann, 
2014). Furthermore, the rational-imitation accounts are very hard to falsify at the 
current stage of research. Both outcomes, that is when infants do not reproduce the 
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observed head touch in the hands-occupied condition and when infants do reproduce 
the unusual head touch in the hands-free condition are interpreted in favor of the 
rational-imitation accounts. Thus, by only focusing on the evaluation of rationality, 
some important puzzle pieces involved in selective imitation may be ignored (Király & 
Oláh, 2018).  
 Likewise, even though motor resonance and action effects may influence 
infants’ imitation in general, no empirical evidence has clearly demonstrated that 
solely these two aspects affect selective imitation in the head-touch paradigm. 
Paulus, Hunnius, et al. (2011b) introduced novel conditions to the head-touch 
paradigm to verify the validity of the non-rational imitation accounts (two-stage 
model; Paulus, Hunnius, & Bekkering, 2013a; Paulus, Hunnius, et al., 2011a, 2011b). 
However, the interpretation of these conditions is somewhat ambiguous. For 
instance, in the so-called button condition, the model’s hands were free but the 
blanket around the torso was fixated by a button. In the button condition infants 
imitated the head touch with a lower frequency than in the hands-free condition – in 
contrast to the predictions of the rational-imitation accounts. Yet, it is not clear at this 
point whether infants have a conceptual understanding of the function of a button (for 
a more elaborated discussion, see Buttelmann & Zmyj, 2012). Furthermore, non-
rational imitation accounts cannot explain selective imitation in studies in which the 
context differed but the body posture of the model was the same in both conditions 
(Buttelmann et al., 2008; Schwier et al., 2006; Zmyj et al., 2009) or when the body 
position differed, but no selective imitation occurred (Király et al., 2013).  
 Therefore, it may be more adequate to step away from a dichotomous view of 
rich and lean interpretations of infants’ cognitive abilities (Racine, 2012) and consider 
an integrative model of selective imitation of the head touch. Zmyj and Buttelmann 
(2014) have suggested that both motor resonance and rational evaluation operate on 
different processing levels and are not mutually exclusive. Motor resonance may 
explain why infants imitate at all, whereas the rational evaluation of action outcomes 
may account for selective imitation. Within this integrative framework, motor 
resonance is described as an automatic bottom-up process. It leads to imitation 
whenever the situational constraints are the same for the infant and the adult model, 
for a familiar action or at least for familiar action elements (e.g., bending the upper 
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body forward or touching an object with the head; for a hierarchical organization of 
actions, see Byrne & Russon, 1998). A lack of motor resonance can lead to inhibition 
of imitation. However, if the situational constraints differ between infant and adult 
model, the rational evaluation (including ostensive cues, goals, means, and 
situational constraints) inhibits automatic imitation in a top-down process. The infant 
will then perform the most efficient action within his or her own action context. 
Importantly, the rational evaluation can inhibit automatic imitation even if the infant 
and the model have the same situational constraints, for instance, when an infant 
observes an unusual, inefficient action (e.g., a person turns on a lamp with her head 
despite her hands being free). Infants expect agents to act efficiently and, thus, they 
assume that this unusual action has an advantage or they would like to figure out the 
reason why a person performed this inefficient action.  
 As outlined in the last paragraph, the integrative model (Zmyj & Buttelmann, 
2014) is a first attempt to combine two contradicting accounts and it provides a 
promising framework to explain the phenomenon of selective imitation in the head-
touch paradigm. Still, the model postulates only theoretical assumptions and does 
not adequately address the underlying mechanisms. To answer the question why 
infants selectively imitate unusual actions, we need to measure the underlying 
cognitive mechanisms on a neural level beyond overt imitative behavior. In the 
following three studies, I aim to elucidate the underlying cognitive mechanisms of 
infants’ action understanding in an adaptation of the head-touch paradigm, which has 
previously been used in behavioral research. Specifically, in this thesis, I test one 
puzzle piece of the integrative model, based on the rational-imitation accounts. Do 
infants hold expectations about others’ actions (presumably based on the principle of 
rational action) in the head-touch paradigm? If so, I propose that these expectations 
should be violated while observing an unusual, inefficient head touch when the 
model’s hands are free (Figure 2). In contrast, expectations should not be violated 
when the model’s hands are restrained while performing a head touch (for details on 
the rationale, see Chapter 4). 
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Figure 2. Adaptation of the integrative model by Zmyj & Buttelmann (2014). Note that 
this graph only illustrates a flowchart for the observation of a head touch in the 
hands-free condition. Neural correlates of the top-down processes based on the 
assumptions of the rational-imitation accounts (Gergely et al., 2002; Gergely & 
Csibra, 2003) are tested in this thesis.  
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4. EXPLORING INFANTS’ NEURAL CORRELATES OF ACTION 
UNDERSTANDING IN THE HEAD-TOUCH PARADIGM  
 As outlined in the previous chapter, the debate on the cognitive mechanisms 
driving infants’ selective imitation is still controversial. So far, behavioral research has  
examined in which situations infants imitate selectively to investigate infants’ action 
understanding (e.g., Gergely et al., 2002; Zmyj et al., 2009). That is, infants’ overt 
behavioral responses have been studied. In contrast, in the current thesis, I employ a 
novel research approach by measuring infants’ neural processes underlying action 
understanding in an adaptation of the head-touch paradigm. Analyzing infants’ neural 
indices of action understanding will help to infer why infants may have imitated 
selectively. In particular, I test infants’ neural underpinnings of action evaluation 
based on predictions of the principle of rational action. Note that, previous selective 
imitation studies measured the behavioral response as a consequence of action 
evaluation, whereas in my thesis I directly assess the neural processes during action 
evaluation (illustrated by the rectangle with the dotted lines in Figure 2). 
 To this end, we adapted the behavioral head-touch paradigm to a 
neurophysiological paradigm using EEG recordings. Electrophysiological measures 
are perfectly suited to study infants’ responses to observed actions (for a 
developmental cognitive neuroscience perspective on action understanding, see Ni 
Choisdealbha & Reid, 2014), because different stages of action processing can be 
reflected in the EEG response with a high temporal resolution. Furthermore, the EEG 
is suitable for young age groups and can be acquired during passive-viewing 
paradigms, in which no behavioral response is needed (for an overview on EEG in 
infants, see DeBoer, Scott, & Nelson, 2007; Hoehl & Wahl, 2012). Distinct analysis 
methods reveal different characteristics in the EEG data that are associated with 
specific cognitive processes. Here, I employ two analysis methods: EEG frequency 
based on fast Fourier transformations (FFTs; Study 1) and EEG amplitude based on 
ERPs (Studies 2 & 3).  
 Rational-imitation accounts imply that selective imitation can be explained by 
differences in VOE in response to the head touch between the hands-free and 
hands-occupied condition. Thus, the rationale of our approach was to design a 
paradigm that tests infants’ action expectations in the head-touch paradigm (Figure 
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3). Note that non-rational imitation accounts do not make any claims about 
expectations and can, thus, neither be supported nor be completely ruled out by our 
research.  
 
 
Figure 3. Illustration of the modified head-touch paradigm. Stimulus examples for the 
A) hands-free and B) hands-restrained condition. In Study 1 and Study 2, infants 
were presented with information on the action context in short video sequences. 
Subsequent static images illustrated expected and unexpected action outcomes. 
Note that in Study 3, we presented only action outcomes in the A) hands-free 
condition. Models did not establish eye contact with infants. EEG activity was 
analyzed in response to the action outcomes only.  
 
 In Study 1 and Study 2, each trial consisted of a video sequence and a static 
action outcome. We first presented infants with short videos (5000 ms) of adult 
models demonstrating that their hands were free (hands-free condition) or restrained 
(hands-restrained condition) in a between-subjects design (adapted from Gergely et 
al., 2002; Zmyj et al., 2009). Subsequent static images (1500 ms) showed action 
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outcomes. The images depicted the same models turning on a lamp or a soundbox 
(i.e., a toy that makes a sound when being touched) using either their head or their 
hand (see Figure 3 for stimulus examples). Within each between-subjects condition, 
infants received the same information on the action context and only the action 
means to achieve the action outcome differed (hand touch or head touch). 
Consequently, whether hand- or head-touch action outcomes were evaluated as 
expected or unexpected depended on the action context only (hands free or hands 
restrained). Besides, this paradigm allowed us to analyze both FFTs and ERPs of the 
same EEG data as we did not present video sequences only (cf Stapel et al., 2010) 
but a combination of videos and static images. In Study 3, we slightly adapted our 
paradigm of the hands-free condition. Here, only static images, illustrating action 
outcomes without prior information on the action context, were presented.  
 After having introduced the EEG paradigm used in this thesis, I will summarize 
the main results of the three studies.  
 
4.1 STUDY 1 – MOTOR SYSTEM ACTIVATION DURING ACTION 
EVALUATION 
 Past research has predominantly investigated infants’ action prediction and 
evaluation in behavioral imitation or eye-tracking paradigms. Typically, infants 
responded with longer looking times (Woodward, 1998), dilated pupils (Gredebäck & 
Melinder, 2010, 2011) and increased imitation rates (Gergely et al., 2002) to 
inefficient or unexpected events.  
 The literature suggests that the motor system plays a pivotal role in predicting 
and evaluating others’ action outcomes (Kilner, Friston, & Frith, 2007; Prinz, 2006; 
Wolpert & Flanagan, 2001). One neural marker associated with motor activation 
during action observation and execution in the EEG is the mu rhythm in the alpha 
frequency band across frontocentral electrode positions (Pfurtscheller & Da Silva, 
1999). Mu rhythm activity has been studied in adults (8 - 13 Hz; 
Muthukumaraswamy, Johnson, & McNair, 2004) and in infants (6 - 9 Hz; Debnath, 
Salo, Buzzell, Yoo, & Fox, 2019; Fox et al., 2016; Marshall & Meltzoff, 2011). In 
particular, a reduction or desynchronization in the mu rhythm indicates stronger 
motor activation (Muthukumaraswamy et al., 2004). First evidence linking infants’ 
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motor activation to action prediction and evaluation was published by Stapel et al. 
(2010). Twelve-month-old infants responded with stronger motor activation on 
frontocentral channels, indicated by a stronger reduction in mu power, during the 
observation of unexpected actions (e.g., lifting a cup to the ear) compared to 
expected actions (e.g., lifting a cup to the mouth). Thus, differences in motor 
activation may reflect infants’ action expectations and subsequent evaluations.  
 To my knowledge, no study has yet elucidated the role of motor activation in 
the head-touch paradigm (i.e., a novel and unfamiliar action context). In Study 1, we 
investigated whether there are differences in mu power between the processing of 
head- and hand-touch action outcomes in the hands-free and in the hands-restrained 
condition (paradigm, see Figure 3). Based on previous research (Koelewijn, van 
Schie, Bekkering, Oostenveld, & Jensen, 2008; Stapel et al., 2010), we expected a 
reduction in mu power in response to unexpected head-touch actions compared to 
hand-touch actions in the hands-free condition. In the hands-restrained condition, we 
expected the opposite result pattern, that is reduced mu power in response to 
physically impossible and thus unexpected hand- compared to head-touch actions. 
This would indicate that infants incorporated the situational constraints during action 
evaluation.  
 To test our hypotheses, we continuously recorded infants’ neurophysiological 
signal during stimulus presentation and calculated infants’ power via FFTs for each 
artifact-free action outcome. Infants’ individual power responses were averaged 
across hand- and head-touch actions. Subsequently, grand average FFTs were 
computed across subjects for hand- and head-touch action outcomes for each 
between-subjects condition (hands free versus hands restrained). In line with infants’ 
individual mu peaks on frontocentral electrodes (F3, F4, C3, C4) and previous 
literature (Marshall & Meltzoff, 2011), we conducted statistical analyses for the 
average power of the 6 – 8 Hz frequency range.  
 
Langeloh, M., Buttelmann, D., Matthes, D., Grassmann, S., Pauen, S., & Hoehl, S. 
 (2018). Reduced mu power in response to unusual actions is context-
 dependent in 1-year-olds. Front Psychol, 9, 36. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2018.00036 
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 Conforming our hypotheses, results in the hands-free condition revealed that 
12- to 14-month-olds’ brains responded with reduced mu power on frontal electrodes 
to unexpected actions (head touch) compared to expected actions (hand touch). We 
interpret this result in line with the predictive coding account (Kilner et al., 2007). 
Stronger motor activation is required for updating prior action predictions after 
observing an unexpected action outcome. In contrast to our hypotheses, in the 
hands-restrained condition, mu power did not differ between action outcomes. This 
might be attributed to insufficient visual processing of the duct tape, the inability to 
form action predictions in this context, the high salience of the head touch or an 
interaction between motor experience and conceptual knowledge (for details, see 
Langeloh et al., 2018).  
 To summarize, Study 1 gives a first indication on the underlying neural 
mechanisms of action processing in the head-touch paradigm. Reduced mu power in 
response to unexpected and inefficient head-touch outcomes may be one 
mechanism of infants’ action understanding underlying selective imitation. So far, 
results of the hands-free condition are in line with the assumptions of top-down 
processes (Zmyj & Buttelmann, 2014) based on the rational-imitation accounts 
(Gergely et al., 2002; Gergely & Csibra, 2003). Infants form expectations about other 
agents’ action outcomes. The VOE while observing unexpected action outcomes is 
associated with stronger motor activation (Kilner et al., 2007). 
 
4.2 STUDY 2 – ERP EVIDENCE FROM THE HEAD-TOUCH PARADIGM 
 Study 1 indicates that infants’ action expectations are violated when observing 
an adult model turning on a lamp with her head while her hands are free. Still, open 
questions regarding the neural processes underlying infants’ observation of head-
touch actions remain: First of all, the cognitive processes during VOE need to be 
examined further to strengthen the interpretation based on predictive coding (Kilner 
et al., 2007) in Study 1. Do 12- to 14-month-olds display a semantic VOE, which 
could be related to a violation of the assumptions of the principle of rational action 
(Gergely & Csibra, 2003)? Second, behavioral research suggests that the 
developmental onset of selective imitation occurs between 9 and 12 months of age 
  27 
(Zmyj et al., 2009). What is the developmental onset of the underlying neural 
mechanisms associated with action understanding?  
 To address these questions and specify the processes measured in Study 1, I 
analyzed ERPs in three experiments3 in Study 2 (paradigm, see Figure 3). In contrast 
to FFTs used in Study 1, ERPs have a very precise time resolution and consist of 
well-defined components, reflecting distinct cognitive processes that occur in a 
sequence (Hoehl & Wahl, 2012; Luck, 2005). Recent research using ERPs to study 
infants’ action understanding or action evaluation predominantly focused on two ERP 
components: the N400 and the Negative central (Nc) component. The N400 
component is sensitive to the violation of a semantic context in the language (Kutas 
& Federmeier, 2011) and action domain (Amoruso et al., 2013). Specifically, the 
N400 component has been linked to the detection of unexpected action outcomes in 
infants. For instance, 9-month-olds’ brains responded with an N400 component 
towards unexpected (e.g., a pretzel at the person’s ear) compared to expected eating 
outcomes (e.g., a pretzel at the person’s mouth; Kaduk et al., 2016; Reid et al., 
2009). Furthermore, infants discriminated between expected and unexpected eating 
actions on the Nc component (Kaduk et al., 2016; Reid et al., 2009), associated with 
the amount of attentional engagement (Reynolds, 2015; Reynolds & Richards, 2005). 
 By analyzing ERPs during the observation of unexpected action outcomes we 
aimed at discriminating low-level attentional mismatches (i.e., responses to novel or 
infrequent stimuli; Vaughan Jr & Kurtzberg, 1992) from more sophisticated detections 
of semantic violations (Amoruso et al., 2013). The latter process may point towards 
violations based on the principle of rational action.  
 In particular, in Experiment 1 (hands-free condition) we intended to explore 
whether, in accordance with the rational-imitation accounts, 1-year-olds’ brains 
respond to head-touch actions with VOE. Furthermore, in Experiment 2 (hands-
restrained condition), we assessed whether this effect is context-dependent. Finally, 
in Experiment 3 (hands-free condition), we tested 9-month-old infants to find out 
whether the developmental onset of the underlying neural mechanisms of action 
understanding and the behavioral onset of selective imitation are alike. If infants 
                                            
3 Please note that the data of Experiment 1 & 2 are similar but re-analyzed data of Study 1 in this 
thesis. 
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display VOE, we expected an increased Nc amplitude and an N400 component in 
response to unexpected action outcomes.  
 Similar to Study 1, the continuous EEG signal was segmented and averaged 
for the presentation of the action outcomes. ERPs in response to hand- versus head-
touch actions were statistically compared within each experiment. 
 
Langeloh, M., Buttelmann, D., Pauen, S., & Hoehl, S. (2019). 12- to 14-month-olds 
 expect unconstrained agents to act efficiently: ERP evidence from the head-
 touch paradigm. Manuscript under review in Developmental Psychology. 
 
 Our results revealed that 12- to 14-month-olds, but not 9-month-olds, were 
surprised when observing head-touch actions when the model’s hands were free as 
indicated by an increased Nc amplitude and an N400-like component (Experiments 1 
& 3). I interpret the increased Nc amplitude in response to unexpected head-touch 
actions as an orienting response – a fast mismatch detection. Increased attentional 
engagement may put infants in a receptive state for learning (Sokolov, 1963, 1990; 
Vaughan Jr & Kurtzberg, 1992). The N400-like response to unexpected head-touch 
actions implies that infants had difficulties in constructing the meaning of this action 
outcome through the contextual information (Amoruso et al., 2013). This detection of 
semantic violations may reflect VOE based on the principle of rational action (for 
alternative interpretations, see Chapter 5). Thus, results of Experiments 1 and 3 are 
in line with the rational-imitation accounts (Gergely et al., 2002; Gergely & Csibra, 
2003). In accordance with behavioral studies, the developmental onset of selective 
imitation and the underlying cognitive processes occurs between 9 and 12 months of 
age (Zmyj et al., 2009).  
 Contrary to our predictions, infants again did not show differences on our 
measures of VOE between hand- and head-touch outcomes when the model’s hands 
were restrained (Experiment 2). Hence, infants’ VOE to unusual head-touch 
outcomes is sensitive to contextual features. For now, my interim conclusion is that a 
VOE response to unusual actions used in previous behavioral studies (i.e., a person 
turning on a lamp with her head while her hands are free) may have influenced 
infants’ selective imitation.  
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4.3 STUDY 3 – THE ROLE OF CONTEXT INFORMATION DURING 
ACTION EVALUATION 
 In Study 2, we showed that two processes occurred in a sequence during the 
observation of an unusual head touch when the model’s hands were free. First, an 
increased Nc amplitude was elicited, associated with more attentional engagement 
(Reynolds, 2015), and then an N400-like component occurred, reflecting the 
detection of violations of semantic action contexts (Amoruso et al., 2013). In Study 3, 
we examined whether infants require the action context to semantically process 
action outcomes in this adaptation of the head-touch paradigm. In other words, we 
were interested in whether we tested infants’ action expectations independent of the 
knowledge (context information) they were provided with during the experiment in 
Study 2. 
 To this end, we slightly changed our EEG paradigm such that we only 
presented 12-month-olds with action outcomes in the hands-free condition. Differing 
from Studies 1 and 2, context information was not provided prior to each trial. In 
previous research, adults but not 5-month-olds processed semantic violations without 
receiving prompts on the action context or initiation (Michel, Kaduk, Ni Choisdealbha, 
& Reid, 2017; Mudrik, Lamy, & Deouell, 2010). Information on the action context may 
have facilitated infants’ detection of semantic violations in Study 2 and previous 
research (Kaduk et al., 2016; Reid et al., 2009).  
 If 12-month-olds experience VOE without prior context information, we 
expected an increased Nc amplitude and an N400 component in response to the 
unusual head touch. To test this hypothesis, we continuously recorded infants’ EEG 
and performed the same ERP analyses on the data as in Study 2 (Experiment 1), for 
a high comparability.  
 
Langeloh, M., Pauen, S., Buttelmann, D., Hoehl, S. (2019). One-year-olds’ event-
 related potentials differentiate expected from unexpected action outcomes 
 without context information. Manuscript under review in Infancy. 
 
  30 
 In the absence of context information, infants responded with increased 
negativity on the Nc amplitude but not with an N400 component to head-touch 
actions. Thus, we replicated the Nc effects of Study 2 (Experiment 1). For a fast 
detection of an unusual action outcome on an attentional level, infants do not need to 
be familiarized with the action context beforehand. However, a deeper semantic 
processing of unexpected actions seems to require prior context information in 
infants as compared to adults. Consequently, at least two distinct mechanisms 
underlie the processing of unusual and unexpected actions: a fast discrimination of 
action outcomes on an attentional level and a more specific mismatch processing on 
a semantic level (for a similar distinction in adults, see Szucs, Soltesz, Czigler, & 
Csepe, 2007).  
 Importantly, these results strengthen our interpretation of the results in Study 
2. When infants received information on the action context, they built up action 
expectations based on the action context. These expectations were violated while 
observing an unexpected head-touch action. The context information may be 
necessary for infants to detect a semantic violation. Consequently, the N400-like 
component in Study 2 does not merely reflect a neural response towards an unusual 
action but rather indicates sophisticated semantic action processing. Likewise, an 
unpublished frequency analysis of the data of Study 3 revealed that infants did not 
distinguish between head- and hand-touch action outcomes via mu frequency power, 
associated with motor system activity. Thus, also the motor system needs context 
information to function as potential underlying mechanism of action evaluation in this 
paradigm (Langeloh et al., 2019, September).  
 In the following chapter, I would like to discuss what we can learn about the 
cognitive processes underlying infants’ selective imitation in the head-touch paradigm 
across Studies 1, 2 and 3.  
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5. GENERAL DISCUSSION  
 Past research has shown that infants selectively imitate unusual head-touch 
actions depending on the action context in behavioral paradigms. Contradicting 
theoretical accounts have proposed explanations for this fascinating and highly 
discussed phenomenon. The integrative model by Zmyj and Buttelmann (2014) 
represents the first attempt to put together these opposing theories. Both rational-
imitation accounts (Gergely et al., 2002; Gergely & Csibra, 2003) and non-rational 
imitation accounts (Paulus, Hunnius, et al., 2011a, 2011b) may operate on different 
processing levels. Bottom-up processes are related to non-rational imitation 
accounts, whereas top-down processing in the integrative model is based on the 
assumptions of the rational-imitation accounts. Accordingly, when infants observe a 
person who turns on a lamp with her head while her hands are free, these two 
processes may be involved and they may interact. First, infants automatically 
resonate with familiar elements of the observed action (e.g., body posture), leading to 
high motor resonance (bottom-up process). Second, infants evaluate the efficiency of 
the observed action via the principle of rational action (top-down process). As infants 
expect another person to achieve a goal in an efficient way, their action expectations 
are violated when they observe a person turning on a lamp with their head while their 
hands are free. Both underlying processes, that is high motor resonance and VOE 
when observing someone performing an unusual, inefficient action, may lead to 
infants’ selective imitation of the head touch (Zmyj & Buttelmann, 2014).  
 In my thesis, I aimed to uncover the underlying cognitive processes during the 
observation of head-touch actions by recording infants’ neurophysiological 
responses. To test the assumptions of the top-down processes linked to the rational-
imitation accounts, I examined neural markers associated with VOE in an adaptation 
of the head-touch paradigm.  
 Overall, results of Studies 1 to 3 suggest that 12- to 14-month-old infants, but 
not 9-month-old infants, display VOE when observing a person performing a head 
touch. This VOE response is context-dependent and is elicited when the model’s 
hands are free but not when the hands are restrained. In Study 1, VOE has been 
linked to a reduction in mu power in response to the unexpected head touch. In 
Study 2, we extended this finding such that when 12- to 14-month-old infants 
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observed an unexpected head touch, their brains responded with increased 
attentional engagement (enhanced Nc amplitude) and a detection of a semantic 
violation (N400 component). Finally, in Study 3, in the absence of contextual 
information, 1-year-olds discriminated between hand- and head-touch outcomes on 
the Nc component only. Thus, infants require information of the action context to 
detect semantic violations within the head-touch paradigm. Based on Study 3, I 
propose that infants’ action expectations in Study 1 and 2 were built up and then 
subsequently violated within the experiments and do not reflect a low-level response 
to unfamiliar actions. Furthermore, I suggest that VOE may have increased infants’ 
curiosity to imitate the unusual head-touch action and thus may have induced 
learning behaviors in previous behavioral studies on selective imitation.  
 VOE has recently been linked to learning (Stahl & Feigenson, 2015, 2017, 
2019). For instance, 11-month-olds engaged in increased object-exploration and 
hypothesis-testing behavior after having observed objects behaving in a physically 
unexpected way (e.g., a car driving through a wall; Stahl & Feigenson, 2015). Similar 
results have been found in the domain of word learning in 3- to 6-year-old children 
(Stahl & Feigenson, 2017). Children learned new verbs better after observing events 
that violated the spatiotemporal principle of continuity (i.e., a toy was hidden under 
one of two cups and was magically revealed under the other cup) compared to 
events that did not violate infants’ expectations (i.e., a toy was hidden under one of 
two cups and was revealed under the original cup). Interestingly, VOE does not only 
shape early learning processes but can also affect memory processes in adults such 
that surprising outcomes are recalled better than less-surprising outcomes (Foster & 
Keane, 2019). Leslie (2004) endorses the notion that VOE indicates and supports 
learning in his commentary on Baillargeon (2004): “A violation of expectation 
happens when you detect that the world does not conform to your representation of 
it. Bringing representation and world back into kilter requires representation change 
and computing the right change is a fair definition of learning” (p. 418).  
 Taken together, observing surprising events can support learning across 
different ages and knowledge domains. It may put infants in a receptive state for 
knowledge acquisition. Accordingly, observing adults who are behaving oddly or 
surprisingly may support infants’ learning of novel actions and lead to higher imitation 
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rates of the respective actions (e.g., turning on a lamp with the head; Gergely et al., 
2002). Importantly, VOE responses do not always reflect the same underlying 
mechanism. VOE can occur at different levels of complexity, from basic motor 
responses and proprioception to a more sophisticated understanding of the physical 
and social environment (for a unifying perspective on infants’ learning based on VOE, 
see Köster, Kayhan, Langeloh, & Hoehl, in press).  
 Which mechanisms, associated with infants’ action understanding, underlie 
VOE in my thesis? I suggest that the VOE responses measured in this thesis can be 
linked to the observation of inefficient action means and, thus, the violation of the 
principle of rational action (Gergely et al., 2002; Gergely & Csibra, 2003). In the 
following chapter, I will critically discuss this teleological interpretation. Furthermore, I 
will outline additional cognitive principles involved in infants’ action understanding 
that need to be considered to compile a detailed picture of what is going on in infants’ 
brains when they observe a head-touch action. 
 
5.1 CRITICAL REFLECTION ON THE RESULTS IN THE LIGHT OF 
CURRENT THEORIES ON INFANTS’ ACTION UNDERSTANDING 
 Past research has shown that infants predict and evaluate others’ actions 
(Gredebäck & Daum, 2015). In Chapter 3.3, I outlined three processes guiding 
infants’ understanding of others’ goal-directed actions (Csibra & Gergely, 2007). 
Accordingly, the VOE responses towards unexpected action outcomes in my thesis 
can be interpreted with regard to different levels of infants’ cognitive abilities.  
Teleological reasoning.  
 According to rational-imitation accounts, the mechanism underlying selective 
imitation is based on teleological reasoning via the principle of rational action 
(Gergely et al., 2002; Gergely & Csibra, 2003). Infants’ expectations about other 
agents behaving rationally and reaching goals efficiently have been examined by 
comparing infants’ responses towards inefficient versus efficient action outcomes 
(Csibra et al., 1999; Gergely et al., 1995; Gredebäck & Melinder, 2010, 2011; Reid et 
al., 2009; Stapel et al., 2010).  
 We extended these findings with the inclusion of the hands-free condition in 
Study 1 and Study 2. More specifically, we identified two neurophysiological 
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measures which suggest VOE in response to inefficient head-touch action outcomes 
when the action context is considered. First, the combination of an Nc and N400-like 
component in response to an unexpected head touch may imply that infants used the 
action context to predict and evaluate action goals based on the principle of rational 
action. One could argue that the increased Nc component only indicates a fast 
orienting response (Sokolov, 1963, 1990; Vaughan Jr & Kurtzberg, 1992), a 
mechanism that does not rely on inferential principles. Thus, the increased 
attentional engagement may not reflect a VOE response based on teleological 
reasoning. Still, it could have put infants into a receptive state, facilitating the 
subsequent detection of semantic violation (see also Study 3). The presence of the 
N400 component, however, may suggest that infants tried to construct semantic 
meaning of the action outcome while considering the action context4. If the action 
outcome does not fit with the meaning built up by the action context, more processing 
capacities are needed, indicated by the N400 response (Amoruso et al., 2013; 
Balconi & Caldiroli, 2011; Reid et al., 2009; Reid & Striano, 2008). 
 Second, infants’ brains responded with a reduction in mu power, that is 
stronger motor activation, towards unexpected head-touch actions. Thus, this 
frequency analysis also suggests that infants require more processing capacities, 
when observing unexpected action outcomes. This is in line with other adult 
(Koelewijn et al., 2008; Manthey, Schubotz, & von Cramon, 2003) and infant studies 
(Stapel et al., 2010) which demonstrate stronger motor activation in response to 
incorrect or unexpected action outcomes. When observing actions that unfold 
differently than expected (prediction error), new predictions have to be generated 
(prediction updating), resulting in stronger motor activation (predictive coding theory 
of the motor system; Kilner et al., 2007). 
 Whereas the results of the hands-free condition indicate that infants may have 
applied rational inferential principles, the results of the hands-restrained condition are 
not as clear-cut. In the hands-restrained condition (Study 1 & Study 2), infants did not 
                                            
4 Note that the interpretation of EEG data or any observable data is limited by the reverse inference 
problem. That is, reasoning backward from patterns of activation to infer a specific underlying 
cognitive process (Poldrack, 2006, 2011). Here, I only provide one possible interpretation of the EEG 
activity associated with the observation of unusual, inefficient head-touch actions.  
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respond with neural indices of VOE towards physically impossible actions. In general, 
by the age of one year and even earlier, infants understand basic physical principles 
(Baillargeon, 2004; Spelke & Kinzler, 2007). Nevertheless, infants need specific 
background knowledge of relevant physical properties to form action predictions and 
evaluate action outcomes. Csibra (2007) stated that “insufficient knowledge about the 
constraints of the actor or the situation may produce wrong predictions or goal 
attribution by teleological reasoning” (p. 70). Thus, infants may simply not have been 
familiar enough with the physical properties of the restraining duct tape to know what 
action outcome to predict next. It is more likely, however, that infants processed the 
duct tape and its physical characteristics extensively (e.g., Zmyj et al., 2009) and that 
the neural mechanisms underlying the detection of a physically impossible action 
outcome differed from the detection of a semantic violation in a social action context 
(for neural processing of physically unexpected outcomes, see Berger, Tzur, & 
Posner, 2006; Köster, Langeloh, & Hoehl, 2019).  
 To sum up, I propose that one interprets the neural indices of VOE revealed in 
the hands-free condition in line with the rational-imitation accounts (Gergely et al., 
2002; Gergely & Csibra, 2003) and, thus, within the top-down process of the 
integrative model by Zmyj and Buttelmann (2014). Teleological reasoning may kick in 
when infants infer the goals of novel actions, functioning as social learning 
mechanism of novel means in longer terms (Csibra & Gergely, 2007). 
Simulation procedures.  
 However, this is only one interpretation of the present data. We need to 
consider alternative mechanisms for an extensive understanding of the results. 
Infants can also predict and evaluate goal states by simulation procedures or action-
effect associations (Csibra & Gergely, 2007), as posited by the non-rational imitation 
accounts (Paulus et al., 2013a; Paulus, Hunnius, et al., 2011a, 2011b) or the bottom-
up process of the integrative model (Zmyj & Buttelmann, 2014). Past research has 
suggested that infants can only interpret others’ actions as goal-directed when they 
have already had sensorimotor experience with the respective action (Gerson, 
Bekkering, & Hunnius, 2015; Sommerville & Woodward, 2005; van Elk et al., 2008). 
Accordingly, the direct-matching hypothesis (Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese, 2001) 
postulates that actions are understood through an automatic bottom-up process, in 
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which the motor system of the observer resonates in response to the observed 
action. The observer’s motor knowledge is used to understand the action by 
activating the same motor representation of the observed action in her or his own 
brain (Rizzolatti et al., 2001). This bottom-up mechanism provides humans with a fast 
and effective simulation of action goals. However, this mechanism is limited as it 
does not apply to novel actions or actions beyond the current own motor repertoire 
(be it due to immaturity or individual motor deficits). Furthermore, it does not work 
when observing non-human agents and whenever the observed actor does not have 
the same motor constraints as the observer (Csibra & Gergely, 2007). Results from 
the hands-free condition in Study 1, that is reduction in mu power in response to the 
head-touch outcomes, could also be interpreted in line with bottom-up processes. As 
Paulus, Hunnius, et al. (2011b) suggested, infants’ body posture during data 
acquisition may have been more similar to the presented action in response to the 
head touch compared to the hand touch. Yet, low-level, bottom-up processes should 
have applied to both the hands-free and hands-restrained condition and would have 
led to similar processing in both conditions. Thus, pure bottom-up processes cannot 
account for the observed pattern of results.  
 To sum up, I cannot rule out that bottom-up simulation processes contributed 
to our results, alongside top-down teleological reasoning. Future research should 
scrutinize the distinction between bottom-up and top-down motor processes. For 
instance, by presenting infants with non-human versus human actors, a more 
comprehensive picture of how these two processes interact could be developed. 
Action-effect associations. 
 Furthermore, infants’ prediction of action outcomes may be facilitated by 
action-effect-associations (Adam & Elsner, 2018). According to ideomotor theory 
(Hommel et al., 2001), actions and effects can be coupled by repeated observations 
through bidirectional associations. The observation of an action elicits the anticipation 
of the associated effect and, in turn, the desired effect automatically activates the 
associated action (e.g., Elsner, 2007; Elsner & Aschersleben, 2003). Likewise, the 
activated motor program is tied to the representation of the action effect (Paulus, 
2012a, 2014). This mechanism works efficiently when observing familiar actions, 
however, it is limited when observing novel actions or encountering situational 
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constraints that require an adjustment of the action to the current action context 
(Csibra & Gergely, 2007). Thus, in the studies of my thesis it is rather unlikely that 
action-effect associations built-up within the experiment accounted for the VOE 
response towards the head touch in the hands-free condition (Study 1 & Study 2). 
The design we used did not foster action-effect associations as the action outcome 
(head/hand), modality (sound/lamp), and gender of the model (male/female) were not 
presented in a blocked design but in randomized order (for a blocked design, see 
Stapel et al., 2010). Still, I cannot exclude the possibility that infants had already built 
up action-effect associations for the hand touch before attending the experiment. 
They may have been surprised when observing a person turning on a lamp with her 
head, just because the effect did not fit the associated action. In addition, we only 
presented infants with action outcomes illustrating action effects (i.e., lamp lightens 
up or sound is played). This may have facilitated infants’ action processing in general 
in our task (Hauf, 2007). However, differences between the hands-free and hands-
restrained condition cannot solely be explained by this mechanism.  
Statistical learning.  
 After having discussed the findings with regard to the three mechanisms of 
infants’ goal attribution, as suggested by Csibra and Gergely (2007), I would like to 
add a mechanism that may have contributed to the results and may have been 
neglected in past reviews on action prediction and evaluation (however, see Gergely 
& Jacob, 2012): statistical or frequency learning. Young infants are sensitive to 
statistical information. They can detect regularities or structure in continuous sensory 
input and, thus, distinguish random from selective sampling (Saffran & Kirkham, 
2018). Initial evidence for statistical learning in infants came from the language 
domain (Saffran, Aslin, & Newport, 1996). Recently, this line of research has been 
extended to visual (Kirkham, Slemmer, & Scott, 2002; Slone & Johnson, 2015) and 
action domains (Baldwin, Andersson, Saffran, & Meyer, 2008; Monroy, Gerson, & 
Hunnius, 2017). For instance, 19-month-old infants learned the structure of 
deterministic versus random action pairs while observing a continuous action stream 
and correctly predicted the next action, measured by predictive gaze shifts (Monroy 
et al., 2017). Still, research with regard to action prediction is sparse. Paulus, 
Hunnius, van Wijngaarden, et al. (2011) posited that infants specifically track the 
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frequency of an agent’s previous actions to predict the next action. Put simply, infants 
may expect that people behave in the same way as they have most frequently done 
before. Accordingly, 9-month-olds were habituated to an agent taking a longer path 
to reach a goal, while the shorter efficient path was blocked. In the test-phase, both 
paths were accessible. Infants, but not adults, continued to expect the agent to take 
the longer, inefficient path and did not switch their expectations based on teleological 
reasoning (Paulus, Hunnius, van Wijngaarden, et al., 2011). 
 How could frequency learning explain the results of this thesis? During daily 
life infants gather plenty of new information about agents and the actions they 
produce. I assume that infants mostly observe other agents manipulating objects with 
their hands. In that sense, touching an object with the head is a highly infrequent and 
odd action. Observing such an infrequent action could elicit a novelty response. 
Consequently, the VOE responses towards the head touch when the model’s hands 
were free could be interpreted with regard to low-level attention processes. Results of 
Study 3 fit into this interpretation. Infants came to the experimental session with 
some general expectations about other people’s actions based on previous 
experiences. It might be that they had never seen a person touch a lamp with their 
head and, thus, responded with an increased Nc component, implying increased 
attentional engagement. In addition, when the model’s hands were tied to the table in 
the hands-restrained condition (Study 1 & Study 2), infants may have not known what 
to predict next, as they had probably never observed a person whose hands were 
tied by duct tape before. To rule out frequency learning across time during the 
experiment in the hands-restrained condition in Study 2, I compared neural 
responses to head- and hand-touch outcomes in the first versus the second half of 
the trials. Even in the first half of trials, infants did not distinguish between hand- and 
head-touch outcomes, suggesting that no initial action expectation had been 
overwritten by repeated observations (Langeloh et al., 2018). 
 Hence, I cannot completely rule out the influence of frequency learning prior to 
the experimental session in our design. Future research should integrate this 
mechanism for infants’ action-goal attribution more thoroughly and disentangle it from 
teleological reasoning (see Scott & Baillargeon, 2013).  
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 Taken together, in our studies, neural processes generated in response to 
observing an unusual head touch point towards inferential rather than to low-level 
mechanisms solely, such as automatic motor programs or novelty responses. To 
interpret the neural indices of VOE in response to the head-touch actions 
comprehensively, alternative mechanisms need to be considered in addition to 
teleological reasoning. Simulation procedures, action effects and statistical learning 
may have contributed to infants’ neural processing of unusual actions.  
 
5.2 FUTURE PERSPECTIVES 
 So far, I have discussed the results of the present thesis in the light of current 
theories on infants’ action understanding. In this chapter, I would like to summarize 
what our findings add to the integrative model of Zmyj and Buttelmann (2014). 
Furthermore, I will suggest directions for future studies in this field of research. 
 In this thesis, I zoomed in closely into the top-down part of the integrative 
model based on the assumptions of the principle of rational action (Gergely et al., 
2002; Gergely & Csibra, 2003). Specifically, I asked if infants have expectations of 
the model’s action outcomes in the head-touch paradigm. The answer is: yes, they 
do. These expectations seem to be violated when observing an unusual or inefficient 
head-touch action. Thus, I can add neural indices of VOE, potentially underlying 
infants’ selective imitation, to the top-down part of the integrative model. These 
neural indices are reduced mu power (Study 1), an Nc (Study 2 & Study 3) and 
N400-like component (Study 2) in response to the unusual head touch, when the 
model’s hands are free. Consequently, the findings of my thesis are in line with 
assumptions of the rational-imitation accounts (Gergely et al., 2002).  
 At this point, I cannot further disentangle whether the VOE displayed by 
infants was based on the non-mentalistic teleological stance or the mentalistic stance 
(Gergely & Csibra, 2003). Moreover, we did not measure the influence of ostensive 
cues on action understanding in the present paradigm, as the adult models did not 
establish eye contact with infants. There is evidence to suggest that ostensive cues, 
such as direct eye contact or infant-directed speech, create learning environments 
supporting a fast transmission of generic knowledge (Csibra & Gergely, 2009). Thus, 
in line with rational-imitation accounts (see Chapter 3.1), ostensive cues could have 
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facilitated action processing in our paradigm (Király et al., 2013). These issues need 
to be addressed in future research. In addition, I surmise that the mechanisms 
underlying selective imitation are too complex to be fully understood by the paradigm 
used in my thesis. For a full-fledged understanding of why infants imitate selectively, 
future research should study the interaction of both top-down and bottom-up 
processes of the integrative model (Zmyj & Buttelmann, 2014). In more detail, future 
research should consider that motor resonance and rationality evaluation may co-
occur and that they may function at different points in time during action processing 
(e.g., high motor resonance may be followed by VOE based on the principle of 
rational action). Finally, other mechanisms of infants’ action understanding, such as 
statistical or frequency learning, should be added to the integrative model in future 
research.  
 Similarly, the integrative model should be applied to study action 
understanding in a more general sense. A first step in this direction has been taken 
by Quadrelli and Turati (2016). The authors have proposed that the motor system (as 
an underlying mechanism of infants’ action understanding) can benefit from an 
interplay between top-down and bottom-up processes in a dynamic and multilayer 
fashion. In this tenet, to construe the meaning of an action, infants need to process 
multiple dimensions and reconstruct actions based on familiarity, motivation, 
efficiency, visual, auditory, emotional, and social cues. The authors suggest that 
infants’ action understanding is driven by top-down processes at first. With increasing 
action experience, bottom-up mechanisms work for familiar actions (a narrowing 
process based on experience). In line with what I have suggested earlier, inferential 
processes and direct matching of familiar actions should not be considered as 
mutually exclusive, but rather as complementing each other (Quadrelli & Turati, 
2016).  
 These integrative models inspire future research to investigate the neural 
mechanisms underlying infants’ action understanding within a broader framework. 
First of all, future research should extend our knowledge of the phenomenon of 
selective imitation in infancy. For instance, the paradigm used in this thesis could be 
adapted to test the assumptions of non-rational imitation accounts (two-stage model; 
Paulus, Hunnius, et al., 2011a; Paulus, Hunnius, et al., 2011b). That is, infants could 
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be presented with head-touch action outcomes only in two within-subjects conditions: 
hands-free and hands-occupied. According to non-rational imitation accounts, mu 
power should be reduced in response to the hands-free compared to the hands-
occupied head touch. In addition, the developmental trajectories of neural and 
behavioral correlates of infants’ action understanding should be examined. 
Interestingly, infants’ selective imitation of the unusual head touch occurs with 12 to 
14 months of age but disappears or transforms into faithful imitation at around 18 
months of age (Gellen & Buttelmann, 2019). Does the function of imitative learning 
change from instrumental to social with increasing age (Over & Carpenter, 2012; 
Uzgiris, 1981)? And what happens to the associated neural mechanisms – are 
toddlers still surprised when observing unusual and inefficient actions, or do they 
become accustomed to viewing them as a function of cultural learning (Tennie, Call, 
& Tomasello, 2009)? To answer these questions, the developmental path from 
selective imitation to over-imitation (i.e., imitating causally unnecessary actions in 
relation to the action goal; for a review, see Hoehl et al., 2019) should be explored. 
 Furthermore, future research should scrutinize the link between the neural 
correlates of action observation and imitative behavior. Even though we suggest a 
relation between motor activation and infants’ imitation in Study 1, this still awaits 
further clarification beyond the head-touch paradigm. Accordingly, we conducted a 
study combining the assessment of infants’ neural processes during action 
observation and their subsequent imitation behavior (Köster, Langeloh, Kliesch, 
Kanngiesser, & Hoehl, 2019). While measuring EEG, we presented 10- and 20-
month-olds with novel, transitive actions, preceded by a communicative or non-
communicative cue. Subsequently, 20-month-olds’ imitation behavior was tested. In 
both age groups, we found an increase in 7 – 10 Hz neural activity during the 
observation of novel actions. This 7 – 10 Hz activity predicted 20-month-olds’ 
imitation rates. Communicative signals neither affected infants’ neural processing of 
observed actions nor their imitation behavior. We surmise that infants acquire novel 
actions via a common neural code for own and others’ actions in the motor system 
(Köster, Langeloh, Kliesch, et al., 2019). These results are very promising. Still, 
future research should address why several studies have reported a decrease in 
infants’ 6 – 9 Hz activity during action observation (e.g., Study 1; Filippi et al., 2016; 
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Saby, Meltzoff, & Marshall, 2013) compared to the 7 – 10 Hz increase observed in 
the aforementioned study.  
 Finally, a promising and related direction for future research is to extend and 
quantify the currently existing measures of VOE in infants. In doing so, the idea that 
situations evoking VOE provide infants with unique learning opportunities could be 
strengthened. We took a first step in this direction by applying an innovative rhythmic 
visual brain stimulation method to 9-month-olds (Köster, Langeloh, & Hoehl, 2019). 
We visually entrained infants’ theta (4 Hz) and alpha (6 Hz) rhythms while presenting 
expected (e.g., a person puts a pretzel to the mouth) versus unexpected events (e.g., 
a person puts a pretzel to the ear). Our results revealed that visually entrained theta 
oscillations sharply increased for unexpected compared to expected events. In 
contrast, visually entrained alpha oscillations did not differ between conditions. We 
suggest that this increase in entrained theta oscillations reflects the integration of 
novel information into existing representations and, thus, learning (Köster, Langeloh, 
& Hoehl, 2019). In a next step, VOE on a neural level should be directly related to 
learning measures, such as imitation behavior (for additional learning measures in 
infants and children, see Stahl & Feigenson, 2015, 2017).  
 All in all, in this thesis I added neural indices of VOE, implying surprise during 
the observation of inefficient action means in the head-touch paradigm, to the top-
down processes of the integrative model (Zmyj & Buttelmann, 2014). When infants 
observed inefficient actions, which have recently been used in studies on selective 
imitation, their brains responded with enhanced processing or VOE. This neural 
process can only be understood within the context of granting infants the ability to 
form rational inferences.  
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6. CONCLUSION  
 Let us return to the example of opening a door, used in the Introduction. 
Imagine your infant imitates the unusual action (i.e., opening the door with the 
shoulder) but only when you did so with your hands free. Why does your infant 
selectively imitate this unusual action and what happens in your infant’s brain during 
the observation of this action? 
 To answer these questions, I have investigated the neural cognitive processes 
underlying the observation of actions in an adaptation of the head-touch paradigm. 
By measuring infants’ neurophysiological responses, I demonstrated neural indices 
of VOE towards unusual and inefficient head-touch actions. Thus, 12-month-olds, but 
not 9-month-olds, were surprised when they observed actors not behaving in an 
efficient way. This surprise reaction was dependent on the action context and did not 
occur when the model’s hands were tied to the table.  
 Even though pre-verbal infants cannot explicitly express their surprise, we 
were able to measure this implicit response in the EEG. By doing so, we have moved 
a step closer to unravelling one question that has occupied developmental scientists 
for the last decade: why do infants imitate selectively? The findings of this 
dissertation strengthen the assumptions of the rational-imitation accounts (Gergely et 
al., 2002; Gergely & Csibra, 2003), reflected by the top-down processes in the 
integrative model of selective imitation (Zmyj & Buttelmann, 2014). Future work 
should consider the interaction of different cognitive processes underlying infants’ 
action understanding from automatic low-level processes to teleological reasoning.  
 To conclude, our studies have paved the way to further our understanding of 
infants’ action perception and observational learning. Understanding the neural 
processes and mechanisms of infants’ action perception in more depth, will help us 
to adequately foster the ideal observational learning conditions of novel actions. The 
results of this dissertation suggest that presenting infants with surprising action 
means puts them in an optimal receptive state for knowledge acquisition.  
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During social interactions infants predict and evaluate other people’s actions. Previous
behavioral research found that infants’ imitation of others’ actions depends on these
evaluations and is context-dependent: 1-year-olds predominantly imitated an unusual
action (turning on a lamp with one’s forehead) when the model’s hands were free
compared to when the model’s hands were occupied or restrained. In the present study,
we adapted this behavioral paradigm to a neurophysiological study measuring infants’
brain activity while observing usual and unusual actions via electroencephalography.
In particular, we measured differences in mu power (6 – 8 Hz) associated with motor
activation. In a between-subjects design, 12- to 14-month-old infants watched videos of
adult models demonstrating that their hands were either free or restrained. Subsequent
test frames showed the models turning on a lamp or a soundbox by using their head
or their hand. Results in the hands-free condition revealed that 12- to 14-month-olds
displayed a reduction of mu power in frontal regions in response to unusual and thus
unexpected actions (head touch) compared to usual and expected actions (hand touch).
This may be explained by increased motor activation required for updating prior action
predictions in response to unusual actions though alternative explanations in terms
of general attention or cognitive control processes may also be considered. In the
hands-restrained condition, responses in mu frequency band did not differ between
action outcomes. This implies that unusual head-touch actions compared to hand-
touch actions do not necessarily evoke a reduction of mu power. Thus, we conclude
that reduction of mu frequency power is context-dependent during infants’ action
perception. Our results are interpreted in terms of motor system activity measured via
changes in mu frequency band as being one important neural mechanism involved in
action prediction and evaluation from early on.
Keywords: EEG, infants, action perception, action understanding, mu frequency, mirror neuron system
INTRODUCTION
From birth on, infants take part in social interactions. These interactions with others are essential
for the development of social-cognitive skills (Striano and Reid, 2006). An important ability trained
in such interactions is to predict another person’s behavior and to react accordingly. This ability
comprises that if the prediction turns out to be wrong (prediction error), the corresponding
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representation is updated appropriately (Kilner et al., 2007).
Even though it is well established that the underlying action
understanding starts developing early in life (Gredebäck and
Daum, 2015), many open questions regarding its mechanisms
remain. In the current study, we present evidence that motor
activation in the mu frequency band is involved in infants’ action
processing in the context of unknown objects and that infants
take into account visible action constraints when evaluating
actions on unknown objects.
Action understanding consists of both the ability to predict
and to evaluate others’ actions (Gredebäck and Daum, 2015). The
ability to predict what others will do next has been observed from
6 months on. By this age, infants show predictive eye movements
to a target location of a goal-directed action involving everyday
objects (e.g., phone or cup). In the second half of their 1st year,
they predict more general action goals such as putting a ball
into a bucket or bringing food or a cup to another person’s
mouth (Falck-Ytter et al., 2006; Gredebäck and Melinder, 2010;
Hunnius and Bekkering, 2010). The ability to evaluate actions
has also been observed from 6 months on. Action evaluation is
usually measured following the execution of an either expected
or unexpected action (Gredebäck and Daum, 2015). Looking
time studies demonstrate that infants look longer at actions with
unexpected changes in the goal of a directional action (e.g.,
Woodward, 1998; Reid et al., 2007). Measuring pupil dilation in
response to usual vs. unusual actions o ers another method to
gain insight into infants’ action evaluation. Pupil dilation usually
follows after attention grabbing or unusual events (Libby et al.,
1973). Gredebäck and Melinder (2010) found that 6- and 12-
month-old infants’ pupils dilated in response to unusual feeding
actions (e.g., spoon with food put to the hand). Hence, we already
know that infants predict and evaluate another person’s behavior
indicating a quite elaborate action understanding that emerges
during the 1st year of life. Behavioral imitation studies provide
yet another approach to examine infants’ action understanding,
but are often used with slightly older children (e.g., Gampe
et al., 2016). Interestingly, behavioral studies show that infants
do not imitate every action they observe. They do so selectively
depending on characteristics of the model, such as his or her
reliability (Zmyj et al., 2010), group membership (Buttelmann
et al., 2013) or external factors such as situational constraints
(Gergely et al., 2002).
Gergely et al. (2002) investigated how infants imitate another
person’s action according to e ciency and situational constraints.
The authors found that 14-month-old infants were more likely
to imitate an unusual head-touch action (i.e., turning on a lamp
using the head) when the model’s hands were free compared to
when her hands were occupied by holding a blanket. Gergely et al.
(2002) concluded that this is because infants evaluated actions
according to their e ciency or rationality in the given situation
(Gergely and Csibra, 2003). This finding was replicated using
similar paradigms and designs, and by testing even younger age
groups (Schwier et al., 2006; Buttelmann et al., 2008; Zmyj et al.,
2009; Gellén and Buttelmann, 2017). In particular, Zmyj et al.
(2009) showed that 12- but not 9-month-old infants considered
non-voluntary physical restraints (i.e., model’s hands tied to
the table) when imitating unusual head-touch actions. However,
divergent interpretations relating infants’ selective imitation
behavior to more basic attention processes or motor resonance
(i.e., to map others’ actions onto one’s own motor repertoire)
have been brought forward (Paulus et al., 2011a,b; Beisert et al.,
2012; but see also Buttelmann and Zmyj, 2012; Buttelmann et al.,
2017).
Thus, in the present study, we measured infants’ neural
responses when observing head-touch actions similar to the
original paradigm by Gergely et al. (2002) in order to investigate
possible neural mechanisms, particularly the role of motor
activation during the observation of unusual actions. In contrast
to previous imitation studies, we did not focus on behavioral
responses (i.e., imitation rates) as dependent variable, but rather
explored the role of motor activation in infants’ brains. The
rationale of this approach is that selective motor activation
during action observation is likely to be involved in action
understanding, as action understanding is shaped by action
skills. In particular, Hunnius and Bekkering (2014) found that
any progress in motor development is typically associated with
improved action understanding, resulting mainly from actively
experiencing motor actions (see also Sommerville et al., 2005).
This is in accordance with results that suggest that 10-month-
olds’ motor actions develop ahead of their ability to predict action
outcomes (Rosander and von Hofsten, 2011). In addition, Stapel
et al. (2016) showed that infants who were experienced crawlers
but not yet walkers were more accurate in predicting crawling
actions than walking actions in an eye-tracking experiment (see
also the eye-tracking study by Bache et al., 2017).
These studies suggest that one of the functional mechanisms
underlying action understanding is the mirror neuron system
(MNS).Mirror neurons discharge during both action observation
and action execution (Rizzolatti et al., 2001; Rizzolatti and
Craighero, 2004). Thus, observed actions seem to activate motor
processes or schemas in the observer’s brain that would also be
activated if the person executed the action themself (Prinz, 1997).
Consequently, this motor system might be highly relevant for
action prediction and evaluation (Wolpert and Flanagan, 2001;
Prinz, 2006; Kilner et al., 2007).
One neural marker indicating motor activation and activation
of the MNS during action observation and execution is the
mu rhythm in the electroencephalogram (EEG) across central
electrode sites. Mu rhythm activity has been examined in adults
(e.g., Muthukumaraswamy et al., 2004; Lepage and Theoret,
2006) and in infants (e.g., van Elk et al., 2008; Southgate et al.,
2009; Stapel et al., 2010; Marshall and Meltzo , 2011; Cuevas
et al., 2014). It is measured in the standard alpha frequency band
(for adults at about 8–13 Hz and for infants at about 6–9 Hz)
and is thought to reflect sensorimotor cortical activation (for a
meta-analysis on EEGmu rhythm, see Pfurtscheller and Da Silva,
1999; Pineda, 2005; Fox et al., 2016). In particular, a suppression
or desynchronization in themu frequency band is associated with
motor activation during action observation and execution. The
decreasing mu power with movement onset indicates a decrease
in neuronal synchrony reflecting the processing of movement-
related information. Thus, mu rhythm is often interpreted as a
neural correlate representing a link between action perception
and production (Muthukumaraswamy et al., 2004).
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Several infant studies suggest that the infant central mu
rhythm is analogous to the adult mu rhythm (Marshall
and Meltzo , 2011). Southgate et al. (2009) demonstrated
stronger mu desynchronization for observation and execution
of reaching actions relative to baseline in 9-month-old infants.
A second study showed similar results and reported stronger
mu desynchronization in response to a reaching hand in
a grasping posture even when the action outcome was not
visible (Southgate et al., 2010). Thus, mu desynchronization
additionally reflects infants’ prediction of the motor program
of an anticipated action. Furthermore, significantly stronger mu
desynchronization compared to baseline was found in 14-month-
olds for the observation and execution of button presses in a live
EEG paradigm (Marshall et al., 2011).
Mu desynchronization in infants seems to depend on active
experience and, thus, on whether or not an action is already
in the infants’ motor repertoire (van Elk et al., 2008; Gerson
et al., 2015). In this line, spectral power in the 7–9 Hz frequency
band was more suppressed in 14- to 16-month-olds for the
observation of crawling compared to walking (van Elk et al.,
2008). This e ect was highly related to infants’ own crawling
experience in that more experienced crawlers showed stronger
mu desynchronization. In addition, mu desynchronization was
sensitive to bidirectional action-e ect associations (of sounds
and rattles) in 8-month-olds (Paulus et al., 2012). In sum, this
branch of research indicates that motor activation measured
by mu desynchronization depends on experience with stronger
reduction of mu frequency power occurring for more familiar or
trained actions.
In addition, mu desynchronization can be related to
generating action predictions (Stapel et al., 2010; Saby et al.,
2012). Stapel et al. (2010) found stronger mu desynchronization
on fronto-central and mid-frontal channels in 12-month-olds in
response to extraordinary actions (e.g., lifting a cup to the ear)
compared to ordinary actions (e.g., lifting a cup to the mouth).
The authors interpreted this result by applying the theory of
predictive coding (Kilner et al., 2007): According to this theory,
the MNS forms predictions about another person’s action given
an assumed goal. The MNS constantly checks whether the
predicted action goal still matches what is being observed. For
unusual action outcomes, like putting a cup to the ear, there is a
mismatch between prediction and observation. Consequently, a
new prediction has to be generated and this results in stronger
motor activation (Gardner et al., 2015).
To summarize, analyzing mu frequency band power allows us
to investigate infants’ action processing. While studies on infants’
own action experiences reported increased motor activation
when observing more familiar actions, studies manipulating
action outcomes found that unexpected outcomes elicit a
stronger mu desynchronization than expected outcomes. Thus,
the mu frequency seems to be involved in both motor resonance
depending on action experiences and on action prediction.
However, previous research predominantly investigated mu
frequency power in response to actions with familiar objects
(e.g., a cup or food). This o ers us a unique opportunity to
study the cognitive processes during infants’ observation of head-
touch actions with novel objects as used in previous behavioral
studies on selective imitation. In particular, reduced mu power
during unusual head-touch actions (compared to hand-touch
actions) would speak for the induction of a prediction error while
watching these actions in the absence of situational constraints.
On the other hand, stronger mu suppression in response to hand
actions would argue for the role of previous motor experience
in processing these actions, since infants much more frequently
manipulate objects with their hands.
Thus, this is the first study investigating the neural
mechanisms underlying the observation of an unusual head
touch in adaptation to paradigms previously used in imitation
studies (Gergely et al., 2002; Zmyj et al., 2009). Here, we explored
possible neuronal mechanisms that might have influenced
selective imitation demonstrated in previous studies. In addition,
we aimed to elucidate whether these neural mechanisms are
sensitive to the action context or not (cf. Zmyj et al., 2009).
To examine infants’ neural processing, we designed an EEG
study measuring context-dependent motor system activity via
mu frequency power during infants’ perception of di erent
action outcomes. In a between-subjects design, 12- to 14-month-
olds watched short video sequences of models demonstrating
that their hands were free (hands-free condition) or restrained
(hands-restrained condition). Subsequent test frames showed the
same model turning on a lamp or soundbox using either their
head or their hand. We intended to explore whether there were
di erences in mu power between processing of head- and hand-
action outcomes in the hands-free condition and whether mu
power varied depending on situational constraints in the hands-
restrained condition.
We hypothesized that if prediction error and updating (cf
Kilner et al., 2007; Stapel et al., 2010) take place when infants
observe others using their head rather than their hand to
manipulate an object, then reduced mu power on central
channels in response to head actions compared to hand actions
should occur in the hands-free condition. In the hands-restrained
condition, we expected the opposite result pattern if infants
incorporate situational factors while predicting and evaluating
action outcomes (i.e., reduced mu power in response to hand
compared to head actions). If motor experience influences mu
frequency power (van Elk et al., 2008; Gerson et al., 2015),
then lower mu power indicating motor resonance in response
to familiar hand actions compared to less familiar head actions
should be demonstrated in the hands-free condition and possibly
also in the hands-restrained condition. If infants do not take into
account context information, then results should be similar in
both the hands-free and the hands-restrained condition.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
The final sample consisted of 22 12- to 14-month-old infants (11
girls,M = 13 months 2 days, SD = 23 days, age range = 12 months
5 days – 14 months 24 days) in the hands-free condition and
20 infants (9 girls, M = 12 months 25 days, SD = 22 days, age
range = 12 months 1 day – 14 months 29 days) in the hands-
restrained condition. Infants were recruited from a midsized
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German city and surrounding areas. They were from middle-
class background, born full-term (37–41 weeks of gestation),
Caucasian and without any known neurological problems. In
addition, 32 infants were tested but excluded from the final
sample due to fussiness (i.e., infants showed too many movement
artifacts or started crying before being presented with the
required number of trials), another 39 infants failed to provide 10
artifact-free trials per within-subjects condition, in 4 additional
infants contact of the reference electrode was not satisfactory (i.e.,
very spiky signal of all electrode channels) and in two sessions
technical and experimental errors occurred. This attrition rate is
within the typical range for infant EEG studies of 50–75% (e.g.,
DeBoer et al., 2007; Stets et al., 2012). The loss of participants
mainly resulted from 12- to 14-month-olds’ di culty to sit
motionless during the presentation of multiple trials, as it is
required for acquiring valid EEG data. There is no indication
for a systematic distortion of our sample. Informed verbal and
written consent were obtained from each participant’s parent
before conducting the experiment. Infants received a certificate
with their photo for participation. Experimental procedures were
approved by the ethics committee of Friedrich Schiller University
in Jena (reference 3752-04/13).
Stimuli
Infants were presented with video clips and photographs showing
adult models performing head or hand actions (adapted from
Gergely et al., 2002; Zmyj et al., 2009). Two di erent types
of videos were used: To establish context and motivation at
the beginning of the experiment, infants watched two pre-
demonstration videos showing a female or male adult sitting
at an empty table demonstrating that the hands were free or
restrained by turning them. Each participant watched both videos
in randomized order regarding sex of the model and situational
constraints.
Following the pre-demonstration videos, each trial of
the demonstration-phase videos illustrated the action context
depicting one of four models (two males, two females) sitting
at a table with a touch light in front of them. Subsequent
test frames depicted action outcomes. In the hands-restrained
condition (adapted from Zmyj et al., 2009), the model’s hands
were tied to the table with duct tape and could not be moved
freely. In the hands-free condition, a line of duct tape was
visible on the table but the model’s hands were free. In both
conditions, subsequent test frames showed a model turning on
a lamp using either their hand or their head (see Figure 1). The
model did not establish eye contact with the observer during the
whole experiment. In half of the trials, a round lamp (12 cm
diameter) mounted on a black box (27 cm ⇥ 20 cm ⇥ 6 cm)
was illuminated while the model was touching it (cf Meltzo ,
1988). To increase infants’ attention toward the presentation,
in the other half of trials a toy-squeezing sound was generated
while the model was touching a blue and green soundbox
(13 cm ⇥ 13 cm ⇥ 11.5 cm) (in accordance with Buttelmann
et al., 2007). The sound was presented with a maximum intensity
of 75 dB.
In the test frames, the model was presented on screen with
a width of approximately 9.13 cm (visual angle of 9.49 ) and a
height of 10.34 cm (visual angle of 10.74 ) measured from head to
table. The touch light was presented with a size of 4.6 cm⇥ 8.4 cm
(visual angle of 4.79  ⇥ 8.73 ) and the soundbox with a size
of 4 cm ⇥ 4.5 cm (visual angle of 4.17  ⇥ 4.69 ). Test frames
were adjusted to each other with Adobe Photoshop CS4 extended
in terms of brightness and contrast (all ps > 0.05). Figure 1
depicts example trials in which the model turns on the light or
produces a sound by using either his or her hand or head in both
conditions.
Procedure
Infants were tested individually in a quiet, dimly lit room. The
testing area was separated from the rest of the laboratory by
dark blue colored room dividers. Infants sat on their parent’s lap
in front of a 75 Hz 19-inch stimulus monitor with a viewing
distance of 55 cm. Parents were instructed not to interact
with the infant during data collection. In both the hands-free
and hands-restrained condition, the experiment consisted of
one block of a maximum of 120 trials. This block comprised
60 trials illustrating a hand touch and 60 trials illustrating a
head touch. The videos were displayed in semi-randomized
order via the software Presentation (Neurobehavioral Systems,
Albany, CA, United States) with the constraint that the same
modality (light/sound), gender (male/female) or outcome (hand
touch/head touch) were not presented three times consecutively
and that all 16 possible test pictures (light/sound, head
touch/hand touch, for each of the four models) were displayed
within the first 48 trials. To avoid confounding e ects of the first
observed action, action outcomes (head and hand touch) were
counterbalanced between participants in the first trial of each
condition.
Figure 1 shows an exemplary stimulus trial sequence. At
the beginning of the trial, a central attractor was presented
for an average of 1000 ms to catch infants’ attention. The
subsequent video sequence depicted the model showing that
the hands were free or restrained by wiggling for 5000 ms.
After that, a blank screen was presented for a random period
between 800 and 1000 ms. Lastly, the test frame representing
hand- or head-action outcomes was presented for 1500 ms.
Each trial lasted 8500 ms leading to a maximum total testing
time of 17 min. Short breaks could be taken after the end of a
trial, when the infant became tired or fussy. The session ended
when the infant no longer attended to the screen. EEG activity
was recorded continuously and infants were video-recorded
throughout the experiment for o ine coding of looking behavior
and movements.
EEG Recording and Analyses
Electroencephalogram was measured by a 32-channels ActiCap
system (Brain Products, Gilching, Germany) with 32 active
silver/silver chloride (Ag/AgCl) electrodes arranged according
to the 10–10 system. Horizontal and vertical electrooculograms
were recorded bipolarly. Impedances were controlled at the
beginning of the experiment and accepted when below 20 k.
Sampling rate was set at 250Hz. Electrode signals were referenced
to the right mastoid electrode and amplified via a BrainAmp
amplifier.
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FIGURE 1 | Stimulus examples of lamp and sound modality for (A) hands-free and (B) hands-restrained condition. Persons appearing in this figure consented to the
publication of these images.
EEG Preprocessing
Electroencephalogram data were first processed by using
BrainVision Analyzer 2 (Brain Products, Gilching, Germany)
and further analyzed in Fieldtrip (Oostenveld et al., 2011). Raw
data were filtered o -line with a 0.3–30 Hz band-pass filter to
remove frequencies not related to cortical processes of interest.
Data were then re-referenced to the average mastoids (TP9,
TP10). Data were automatically excluded if the amplitude of
the analyzed channels exceeded a voltage threshold of 200 µV
within a 200 ms interval. Thus, data including gross motor
movements were rejected from final analysis by this automatic
artifact rejection algorithm. Data were then segmented into
epochs of waveforms that comprised 200 ms before stimulus
onset of the test frame, demonstrating a head touch or a hand
touch, through 1500ms following stimulus onset. Infants’ looking
behavior was video-coded o ine. Only trials in which infants
did not blink and paid attention to the whole presentation
of the test frame, showing head- and hand-action outcomes,
were included in further analyses. In addition, videos were
coded for more subtle movements of infants, such as hand or
head movements that resembled actions performed by the video
models in our stimuli (i.e., pressing a button by hand or by
head or similar actions, like reaching or pointing) (cf Marshall
et al., 2011). An independent rater, blind to hypotheses, coded
infants’ movements during all observed action outcomes. An
additional coder rated 25% of the videos from each condition
(hands-free and hands-restrained). A high degree of inter-rater
reliability was found between 758 measurements with an average
measure intraclass correlation (ICC) of 0.840. To ensure that
motor activation related to the target actions (head touch and
hand touch) was equivalent between conditions (hands-free
and hands-restrained) and within conditions, we conducted a
mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA) with the between-subjects
factor condition (hands-free, hands-restrained) and the within-
subjects factor outcome (target action movement during head-
touch outcomes, target action movement during hand-touch
outcomes). The ANOVA did not yield a significant main e ect of
outcome, F(1,40) = 2.394, p = 0.130, or condition, F(1,40) = 0.985,
p = 0.327. Likewise, no significant interaction between condition
and outcome was found, F(1,40) = 2.394, p = 0.130. Overall,
infants very rarely performed actions similar to the hand and
head touch demonstrated by the video models during the whole
experiment (M = 1.69 movements, SD = 1.62 movements).
Thus, significant di erences between conditions and/or action
outcomes cannot result from di erences in infants’ movements
similar to the presented target actions (hand and head touch).
Data were then baseline-corrected using 200 ms prior to the
onset of the test frame and finally segmented for hand and
head touch in both hands-free and hands-restrained conditions,
respectively.
Frequency Domain Analysis
Artifact-free data segments were submitted to fast Fourier
transformations (FFTs). For each segmented test frame (hand or
head touch), the power was computed from 0 to 1,500 ms relative
to the onset of the related stimulus using a Hanning-tapered
window of the same length (by applying the ‘ft freqanalysis’
function with ‘mtm t’ method as implemented in Fieldtrip).
Power estimates were calculated for frequencies ( 23 Hz bins)
between 0 and 124.667 Hz. Grand averages of the FFTs were
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FIGURE 2 | Individual power spectra across an average for hand- and head-touch actions across an average of frontal and central electrodes (F3, F4, C3, C4) for
(A) hands-free and (B) hands-restrained condition.
computed for both hand- and head-action outcomes in the
hands-free and hand-restrained condition.
Aminimum of 10 artifact-free trials per outcome was required
for an infant to be included in the statistical analyses. In the
hands-free condition, each infant contributed 13 to 56 trials
(M = 21.23, SD = 9.88) to the head outcome and 11 to 56 trials
(M = 19.18, SD = 9.81) to the hand outcome. In the hands-
restrained condition, each infant contributed 10 to 34 trials
(M = 17.25, SD = 5.87) to the head outcome and 10 to 29 trials
(M = 16.05, SD = 5.45) to the hand outcome. Across conditions
each infant contributed 10 to 56 (M = 19.33, SD = 8.36) valid
trials to the head outcome and 10 to 56 valid trials to the hand
(M = 17.69, SD = 8.10) outcome.
In accordance with previous research we analyzed central
electrode positions on the left and right hemisphere (C3,
C4) to investigate di erences in motor activation indicated
by mu frequency power (e.g., Paulus et al., 2012). As visual
inspection indicated di erences between unusual head-touch
and familiar hand-touch actions especially on frontal channels
and as previous studies also investigated the role of frontal
activation in infants’ action perception (e.g., van Elk et al.,
2008; Stapel et al., 2010), we included lateral frontal channels
(F3, F4) into the final analysis. In addition, parietal channels
P3 and P4 were included in the analysis in order to exclude
the possibility that potential alpha-band e ects were widespread
across the scalp (including posterior regions) suggesting general
arousal rather than involvement of the motor system. Occipital
channels (O1, O2) were not selected for comparison to fronto-
central electrode positions because channels were too noisy and
did not provide enough artifact-free data for valid analyses.
For each participant, a dominant mu peak was identified for
frontal and central electrodes (F3, F4, C3, C4) between 6
and 9 Hz. Analyses revealed that in the hands-free condition
up to 20 infants peaked between 6.7 and 8 Hz in response
to the hand touch and up to 19 infants in response to the
head touch (see Figure 2A). Similarly, in the hands-restrained
condition up to 15 infants peaked in response to the hand
touch and 15 infants in response to the head touch between
6.7 and 8 Hz (see Figure 2B). This is in accordance with
previous research on mu frequency in infants indicating that
mu frequency band falls between 6 to 9 Hz in infants (Marshall
and Meltzo , 2011) and peaks at about 8 Hz in 1-year-
olds (Marshall et al., 2002). Thus, the statistical analyses were
conducted across the average power of the 6 to 8 Hz frequency
range.
Statistical Analysis
To investigate overall di erences between conditions, data
were analyzed by a mixed ANOVA with the between-
subjects factor condition (hands-free, hands-restrained) and
the within-subjects factors action outcome (head, hand),
region of interest (frontal: F3/F4, central: C3/C4, parietal:
P3/P4) and hemisphere (left, right). Partial eta squared (!2p)
or Cohen’s d (d) are reported as estimates of the e ect
size. Greenhouse-Geisser correction for non-sphericity was
employed if applicable for conservative corrections. Fractional
degrees of freedom (df ) were reported when Greenhouse-
Geisser correction was necessary (i.e., when Mauchly’s test
for sphericity was significant) and applied. The significance
level was set at p < 0.05 (two-tailed) for all statistical
analyses.
RESULTS
Hands-Free vs. Hands-Restrained
Condition
To compare results between the hands-free and hands-
restrained condition, we first computed a mixed ANOVA
with the between-subjects factor condition (hands-free, hands-
restrained) and the within-subjects factors action outcome
(head, hand), region of interest (frontal, central, and parietal)
and hemisphere (left, right). Analysis yielded a significant
interaction between condition, action outcome, region of interest
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FIGURE 3 | Grand average EEG power across mu frequency band (6–8 Hz) for electrodes of interest (F3, F4, C3, C4, P3, P4) in response to hand touch (dark gray)
and head touch (light gray) for both hands-free (HF) and hands-restrained (HF) condition. Error bars represent standard errors of the mean.
and hemisphere, F(2,80) = 3.390, p = 0.039, !2p = 0.08 (for
a detailed illustration of main e ects and interactions, see
Supplementary Table 1). Thus, conditions were further analyzed
separately to explain this interaction e ect. Mu power of all
electrodes of interest (F3, F4, C3, C4, P3, P4) is plotted in
Figure 3.
Hands-Free Condition
Infants demonstrated dominant peaks in response to observing
head- and hand-action outcomes in the frequencies of interest (6–
8 Hz) especially on frontal and central electrodes (see Figure 2A).
Visual inspection of the grand average FFTs indicated reducedmu
power in response to the head touch compared to the hand touch.
This tendency was more pronounced on frontal electrodes (see
Figure 4).
The repeated-measures ANOVA (rmANOVA) revealed a
significant interaction of action outcome, region of interest
and hemisphere, F(2,42) = 6.918, p = 0.003, !2p = 0.25 (for
a detailed illustration of main e ects and interactions, see
Supplementary Table 2). In order to resolve this significant
interaction, we conducted three two-way rmANOVAs with
the within-subjects factors action outcome (head, hand) and
hemisphere (left, right) for each region of interest. For frontal
channels (F3, F4), we found a significant main e ect of action
outcome, F(1,21) = 8.675, p = 0.008, !2p = 0.29, indicating that
mu power in both frontal electrodes was significantly lower
in response to head-touch outcomes (M = 11.87, SD = 2.96)
compared to hand-touch outcomes (M = 14.05, SD = 5.35)
independent of hemisphere, F(1,21) = 0.28, p = 0.868. Analysis
of frontal regions did not reveal a significant interaction
between action outcome and hemisphere, F(1,21) = 0.044,
p = 0.836. For central channels (C3, C4), the rmANOVA
analysis yielded a significant interaction of action outcome and
hemisphere, F(1,21) = 7.990, p = 0.010, !2p = 0.28. Post hoc
t-tests for left (C3) and right (C4) hemisphere compared mu
frequency power of hand- and head-action outcomes. On the
right hemisphere mu power was slightly lower in response
to head-touch (M = 13.09, SD = 5.86) compared to hand-
touch outcomes (M = 14.31, SD = 6.89). However, it did not
reach significance, t(21) =  1.932, p = 0.067, d = 0.41. No
significant di erences in mu power were found on the left
hemisphere, t(21) = 1.175, p = 0.253. For parietal channels (P3,
P4), the rmANOVA did not reveal a significant main e ect
of action outcome, F(1,21) = 1.076, p = 0.311, hemisphere,
F(1,21) = 0.004, p = 0.952, nor a significant interaction
between action outcome and hemisphere, F(1,21) = 1.869,
p = 0.186.
Thus, we found reduced mu power in response to head-touch
actions compared to hand-touch actions especially on frontal
electrode positions and a tendency for the same e ect at the right
central electrode site.
Hands-Restrained Condition
In the hands-restrained condition we investigated whether
infants incorporate contextual information while evaluating
action outcomes via the motor system measured by di erences
in mu frequency power. Comparable to the hands-free condition,
the majority of infants peaked in response to observing head-
and hand-action outcomes in the frequencies of interests (6 –
8 Hz) especially on frontal and central electrodes (see Figure 2B).
Visual inspection indicated increased mu power in response to
the head touch and reduced mu power in response to the hand
touch (see Figure 5).
We again conducted a rmANOVA with the within-subjects
factors action outcome (head, hand), region of interest (frontal,
central, parietal) and hemisphere (left, right). There were,
however, no significant interactions of action outcome, region
of interest, and hemisphere, all ps > 0.29. Likewise the analyses
did not reveal main e ects of action outcome, F(1,19) = 1.601,
p = 0.221 or hemisphere, F(1,19) = 0.753, p = 0.396. We
only found a significant main e ect of region of interest,
F(2,27.25) = 15.220, p < 0.001, !2p = 0.45, indicating that
across action outcomes overall mu power was lower at
parietal regions (M = 9.09, SD = 5.49) than at frontal
(M = 12.23, SD = 7.60) and central regions (M = 12.64,
SD = 7.79). In sum, results showed no di erences in mu
power between head and hand touch in the hands-restrained
condition.
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FIGURE 4 | Grand average EEG mu power for hand touch (dark gray) and head touch (light gray) for an average of frontal electrodes (F3, F4) and for an average of
central electrodes (C3, C4) in the hands-free condition. Asterisks depict significant differences with p < 0.05.
FIGURE 5 | Grand average EEG mu power for hand touch (dark gray) and head touch (light gray) for an average of frontal electrodes (F3, F4) and for an average of
central electrodes (C3, C4) in the hands-restrained condition.
DISCUSSION
This study was designed to shed light on the neural mechanisms
underlying infants’ observation of unusual head-touch actions
used previously in selective imitation studies (e.g., Gergely et al.,
2002; Gellén and Buttelmann, 2017). For this, we investigated
the role of motor activation through measuring di erences
in mu frequency power. In addition, we aimed to explore
whether motor activation during action perception is sensitive
to contextual factors. To this end, we adapted a well-known
behavioral imitation paradigm (Gergely et al., 2002; Zmyj
et al., 2009) to an EEG experiment for the first time: In a
between-subjects design, infants were presented with short video
sequences of adult models demonstrating that his or her hands
were either free or restrained. Subsequent test frames showed the
same person turning on a lamp or soundbox using their head
or their hand. Results in the hands-free condition revealed that
12- to 14-month-old infants displayed reduced mu frequency
power in response to unusual head-touch actions compared
to familiar hand-touch actions. Interestingly, in the hands-
restrained condition we did not find di erences in mu frequency
power in response to hand- vs. head-touch actions.
Previous research associated mu desynchronization with
motor activation or cortical processing of movement-related
activity (Fox et al., 2016). In the hands-free condition, significant
changes in mu frequency band in response to the observation
of head-touch vs. hand-touch actions were predominantly found
in frontal regions (F3, F4). Despite other studies demonstrating
changes in mu frequency band on frontal or fronto-central
channels (van Elk et al., 2008; Stapel et al., 2010), e ects of mu
frequency band are often more pronounced on central electrode
positions (Marshall and Meltzo , 2011). Since in our study
no significant di erences in mu power were found on central
channels, an interpretation of our results in terms of alpha power
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associated with general attention or cognitive control processes
unrelated to motor activation may be considered (Marshall et al.,
2009; Quandt et al., 2011; Klimesch, 2012).
In adults, tasks-related modulations in alpha power can be
associated with two controlled functions of attention, namely
selection and suppression. Here, alpha frequency activity is
thought to function as an attention filter and a decrease in
alpha amplitude reflects a release from inhibition. In addition,
alpha-band activity has been suggested to indicate controlled
access of a semantic knowledge system (Klimesch, 2012). Alpha
desynchronization across the whole scalp was reported in 9-
month-old infants in response to objects that were presented after
engaging in mutual eye contact vs. no eye contact. Eye contact
might have put infants in a receptive state of semantic knowledge
acquisition (Hoehl et al., 2014). According to these accounts,
infants may have been more attentive in response to the unusual
head touch.
However, we found significant di erences in alpha power
between unusual and familiar actions only on frontal sites
(parietal channels did not show the same result pattern). This
is in line with previous neurophysiological studies relating
changes in frontal alpha rhythm to early states of observational
and imitative learning (Marshall et al., 2009; Quandt et al.,
2011). Accordingly, brief imitative experience of unfamiliar
actions is associated with larger alpha desynchronization on
frontal channels (Marshall et al., 2009) independent of the
type of training (visual and/or active experience; Quandt
et al., 2011). Thus, neural processing of action observation,
especially on frontal channels, is influenced by a moderate
amount of initial experience with these actions. Neuroimaging
literature suggests that this frontal activation for unfamiliar
actions reflects dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) activation
during an active process of consolidating or forming motor
representations of previously unknown actions (Jeannerod, 2006;
Vogt et al., 2007). With increasing active experience, activation
shifts toward more posterior motor regions for high levels of
expertise (Shadmehr and Holcomb, 1997; Calvo-Merino et al.,
2005; Kelly and Garavan, 2005). In this view, the reduction
in alpha power on frontal channels in response to unusual
head-touch actions compared to hand-touch actions may reflect
a process of mapping observed movements onto previously
created motor memories (Jeannerod, 2006; Marshall et al.,
2009).
Finally, we suggest a third explanation for the frontal e ects in
the hands-free condition based on our hypotheses. If prediction
error and updating (Kilner et al., 2007) take place when infants
observed an unusual action, we expected reduced mu power
in response to unusual compared to familiar action outcomes
(Stapel et al., 2010). If motor experience influenced mu frequency
power in the present study, lower mu power in response to
familiar hand actions compared to unfamiliar head actions was
expected (van Elk et al., 2008; Gerson et al., 2015). We found
reduced mu power in response to the unusual head touch
compared to the familiar hand touch and, thus, propose that
infants updated their action predictions via the motor system
for action outcomes that violated their prior action expectations
(Kilner et al., 2007).
Our neural findings are in line with previous behavioral
research on action understanding suggesting that by the age of
6 months infants are able to predict another person’s actions
(for a similar explanation of the results, see principle of
rationality, Gergely and Csibra, 2003). For example, 6-month-
olds anticipated action outcomes more frequently for functional
compared to non-functional goal-object combinations (e.g., cup
to mouth or to ear) or their pupils dilated in response to
unexpected feeding actions (Gredebäck and Melinder, 2010;
Hunnius and Bekkering, 2010). In addition, our results are in
accordance with previous EEG studies on action processing.
In the hands-free condition, we replicated the finding by
Stapel et al. (2010) that 12-month-olds showed stronger mu
desynchronization in response to extraordinary compared to
ordinary actions. Further EEG studies demonstrated that even
9-month-old infants discriminated familiar vs. unusual eating
actions. Infants responded with an N400-like component only
to unexpected action outcomes (e.g., pretzel put to ear)
indicating a violation of semantic action context (Reid et al.,
2009; Kaduk et al., 2016). Furthermore, infants have been
shown to distinguish between disrupted and complete actions
in terms of increased frontal gamma band activity or more
negative slow wave components (Reid et al., 2007; Pace et al.,
2013). However, low-level explanations (e.g., variability in
stimulusmaterials) might have accounted for di erences between
conditions in previous studies. To sum up, in the hands-free
condition reduced mu power in response to the unusual head
touch indicates that 12- to 14-month-old infants were able to
predict action outcomes after being presented with the action
context.
In addition, we investigated whether context information
influenced motor activation in the hands-restrained condition.
We expected opposite result patterns to the hands-free condition.
Accordingly, the head touch did not elicit lower mu power
compared to hand touch in the hands-restrained condition.
Thus, it seems that infants incorporate situational factors while
evaluating action outcomes. This is in accordance with previous
behavioral studies suggesting that by 6–12 months of age
infants are able to interpret actions as goal-directed and take
into account situational constraints (e.g., Gergely et al., 1995;
Woodward and Sommerville, 2000; Schwier et al., 2006; Zmyj
et al., 2009; Gredebäck and Melinder, 2010). Despite visual
inspection indicating di erences in mu power especially on
central channels, we did not find significant di erent brain
responses between hand- and head-action outcomes in the
hands-restrained condition. In line with previous behavioral
and imitation studies (Gergely and Csibra, 2003; Schwier et al.,
2006; Zmyj et al., 2009), we would have expected infants to
discriminate both action outcomes also in this scenario. The
predictive coding theory proposes that the MNS functions
to recognize and code for goals of observed actions (Kilner
et al., 2004, 2007). Infants should have been able to encode
both action goals and context-specific information to predict
action outcomes and update their predictions in case of
prediction error. When observing a model turning on a lamp
by hand despite the fact that hands were previously tied
to the table, prediction error and prediction updating were
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expected to take place in response to the physically impossible
action.
There are several possible explanations for why we did
not find di erences between hand and head touches in
the hands-restrained condition. First, infants might have not
entirely processed the restraining duct tape visually. Second,
it might be that infants did not know what to predict
when they observed a person whose hands were tied to the
table. In this case subsequent action outcomes would have
not been evaluated in comparison to prior action predictions
(for a similar explanation in word learning by exclusion,
see Grassmann et al., 2015). These explanations are rather
unlikely, as Zmyj et al. (2009) demonstrated that 1-year-olds
imitated selectively depending on the same external physical
constraint when presented on a computer screen. Besides, if
infants did not recognize our situational constraint at all,
results should have revealed similar e ects to the hands-
free condition. Another explanation might be that infants
visually processed the situational constraint but the head
touch was still highly salient. This hypothesis is supported
by a recent eye-tracking study demonstrating that 14-month-
old infants paid a similar high amount of attention to the
head touch of a model irrespective of whether or not the
model was able to use his or her hands (Buttelmann et al.,
2017).
Finally, two di erent processes might have played a role
in the hands-restrained condition: One-year-olds already have
numerous experiences with hand-touch actions as they can
observe other humans turning on switches resulting in visual
(e.g., light) or auditory e ects (e.g., sounds) repeatedly in
everyday life. Increased experience might have enhanced motor
activation at central sites during action observation (van Elk
et al., 2008; Cannon et al., 2014; Gerson et al., 2015). In addition,
infants might have formed action predictions based on semantic
knowledge. Action outcomes that violated these prior predictions
might have led to prediction updating and, thus, increased
motor activation (Kilner et al., 2007). Both high experience and
prediction updating in response to hand actions might have
a ected mu power at the same time in the hands-restrained
condition. Hence, we conclude that motor activation measured
via mu frequency band is context-sensitive in the present study.
However, e ects of experience might have interfered with brain
activity based on predictive coding. This is in accordance with
an adult study measuring influences of motor experience and
conceptual knowledge on brain activity in action perception
(Gerson et al., 2017). Here, motor experience and predictions
based on conceptual familiarity were experimentally manipulated
in a 1-week pre-/post-training design. Results revealed thatmotor
system activity measured via beta power changed in response to
both factors in a parallel but distinct way: Increased experience
led to increased motor activity whereas increased conceptual
information about a previously unfamiliar action led to a relative
decrease of motor activity across time. To summarize, results
of the hands-restrained condition di ered from the hands-free
condition in terms of mu power indicating that mu power
reflecting motor activation during action observation is context-
dependent.
The stimuli used in the present study were based on previous
behavioral imitation studies indicating that 12- to 14-month-olds
are more likely to imitate an unusual head touch depending on
varying situational constraints (Gergely et al., 2002; Zmyj et al.,
2009). Our neural findings extend recent behavioral results as we
revealed di erences in mu power in response to head vs. hand
touch dependent on external situational constraints. In addition,
our results suggest a neural mechanism underlying previous
behavioral findings: Infants might form action predictions and
update their predictions for deviating action outcomes via the
motor system (Kilner et al., 2007). In accordance with the
predictive coding framework, increased motor activation in
response to the unusual head touch might reflect the process
of updating predictions in case of prediction error. This is in
line with research on adults demonstrating increased motor
activation in response to deviating or unusual action outcomes
(e.g., Manthey et al., 2003; Koelewijn et al., 2008). Motor system
activity in adults was even sensitive to the degree of prediction
with increased activation in response to highly predictable action
outcomes (Braukmann et al., 2017).
The present results highlight the role of motor activation
during action perception by utilizing stimuli adapted to previous
behavioral studies. However, with the present neurophysiological
findings we cannot draw any conclusions regarding the possible
e ect on infants’ imitative behavior. Here, we o er one
possible explanation for why infants show increased motor
activation in response to unusual actions; this explanation is
in accordance with the predictive coding theory. The relation
between motor activation and infants’ imitation still awaits
further clarification.
In sum, the present study revealed a reduction in mu power,
which might be related to the motor system, in response to
an unusual head-touch action in 12- to 14-month-old infants.
Reduced mu power in response to unusual compared to familiar
actions may indicate prediction error and updating according to
the predictive coding framework (Kilner et al., 2007). This e ect
was only pronounced in the hands-free condition, suggesting
that the motor system activated during action prediction and
evaluation is context-dependent. Our neuroscientific findings
extend previous behavioral results suggesting that a reduction
of mu frequency power is one possible functional mechanism
underlying infants’ early action understanding.
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Abstract 
Behavioral research has shown that 12- but not 9-month-olds imitate an unusual and 
inefficient action (turning on a lamp with one’s forehead) more when the model’s hands are free. 
Rational-imitation accounts suggest that infants evaluate actions based on the rationality 
principle, that is, they expect people to choose efficient means to achieve a goal. Accordingly, 
infants’ expectations should be violated when observing inefficient actions. However, this has yet 
to be clearly tested. Here, we conducted three electrophysiological experiments to assess infants’ 
neural indices of violation of expectation (VOE) when observing hand- and head-touch actions. 
We presented infants with video sequences showing a model whose hands were either free 
(Experiment 1 & 3) or restrained (Experiment 2). Subsequent images depicted a person turning 
on a lamp or a toy soundbox using her hand or head. We analyzed the Negative central (Nc) 
component, associated with the amount of attentional engagement, and the N400 component, 
reflecting semantic violations. In line with rational-imitation accounts, results revealed that 12- 
to 14-month-olds (Experiment 1) but not 9-month-olds (Experiment 3) were surprised while 
observing an inefficient, hands-free, head touch, as indicated by an increased Nc amplitude and 
an N400-like component. In contrast, infants did not show differences in our measures of VOE 
between head- and hand-touch outcomes when the model’s hands were restrained (Experiment 
2). Thus, 12- to 14-month-olds incorporate the action context when evaluating action outcomes.  
 
Keywords: infants, event-related potentials, action perception, Nc, N400, rational 
imitation 
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12- to 14-month-olds expect unconstrained agents to act efficiently:  
ERP evidence from the head-touch paradigm 
From early on, infants explore their environment and rapidly acquire novel information 
about the world through interactions with others. Imitation is one of the primary social 
mechanisms for young infants to learn about cultural practices, instrumental actions as well as 
their own similarities to other humans (Jones, 2009; Meltzoff & Marshall, 2018; Tomasello, 
1999). Imitation can be defined as copying an action previously demonstrated by another person 
(Paulus, 2011; Zmyj & Buttelmann, 2014). Interestingly, infants do not blindly imitate every 
action they observe; rather, they do so selectively. Examining situations in which infants 
selectively imitate provides a useful approach to gain insights into their socio-cognitive abilities. 
However, many open questions regarding the underlying neuronal and cognitive mechanisms of 
selective imitation remain.  
Past research has demonstrated that infants’ selective imitation depends on factors 
regarding the model (i.e., the person performing the action), such as reliability (Zmyj, 
Buttelmann, Carpenter, & Daum, 2010), group membership (Buttelmann, Zmyj, Daum, & 
Carpenter, 2013), age (Zmyj, Daum, Prinz, Nielsen, & Aschersleben, 2012), the model’s 
intentions (Buttelmann, Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2008) and ostensive communication 
(Király, Csibra, & Gergely, 2013). Furthermore, external factors such as the necessity of the 
performed action (Nielsen, 2006) and the constraints of a given situation (Gergely, Bekkering, & 
Király, 2002) also influence infants’ selective imitation. In particular, the effects of situational 
constraints and action efficiency on infants’ selective imitation has led to a lively debate within 
the field of cognitive developmental psychology (Paulus, 2012; Zmyj & Buttelmann, 2014). 
Here, we apply electrophysiology to elucidate cognitive processes involved in infants’ action 
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observation in a widely applied imitation paradigm, which was introduced to test infants’ 
selective imitation (Gergely et al., 2002). 
The head-touch paradigm employed by Gergely et al. (2002) with 14-month-old infants 
features a model turning on a lamp with her head (head touch). One group of infants observed 
the unusual action while the model’s hands were visible and free (hands-free condition) similar 
to the original setting by (Meltzoff, 1988). A second group observed the same action while the 
model’s hands were occupied, holding a blanket (hands-occupied condition). One week later 
infants were given the opportunity to explore the lamp themselves. Infants imitated the irregular 
head action more often in the hands-free (69 %) than in the hands-occupied condition (21 %). 
Thus, 14-month-olds imitated an unusual and inefficient action far more frequently when the 
model had no discernible reason to perform the action in such a manner. This finding has been 
replicated multiple times within similar paradigms (Gellén & Buttelmann, 2017; Schwier, von 
Maanen, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2006), younger age groups (Zmyj, Daum, & Aschersleben, 
2009) and even with humans’ closest relatives, chimpanzees (Buttelmann, Carpenter, Call, & 
Tomasello, 2007). 
Whereas there is consensus concerning the existence of selective imitation, explanations 
differ regarding the level of infants’ assumed cognitive abilities and the underlying mechanisms. 
On the one hand, rational-imitation accounts claim that selective imitation occurs because of 
infants’ rational evaluation of the situation (Buttelmann et al., 2008; Gergely et al., 2002). These 
accounts suggest that infants interpret actions in accordance with the principle of rational action 
postulating that actions are executed in order to achieve a future goal-state with the most efficient 
means available. According to the teleological stance, the principle of rational action enables 
infants to relate and evaluate three components of another person’s behavior: situational 
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constraints (e.g., hands free or occupied), goal states (e.g., turn light on), and actions (Gergely & 
Csibra, 2003). Consequently, infants can predict the most efficient action based on the goal state 
and the situational constraints. Whether infants imitate a certain behavior or not depends on the 
evaluation of the model’s behavior. When the model’s hands are occupied, infants interpret the 
head touch as being the most efficient means to turn the lamp on. Since infants do not share this 
situational constraint when they interact with the lamp, they predominantly use their hands to 
turn it on. When the model turns on the lamp with her head even though her hands are free, 
infants are surprised and might infer that the unusual action offers some advantage. That is they 
may infer that this is the most efficient means in this situation (Gergely & Csibra, 2003). 
According to the teleological stance, infants do not necessarily ascribe intentions to the model 
during action evaluation. Rather, they base their evaluation solely on observable factors. 
However, the principle of rational action can also be applied to a mentalistic stance, stating that 
selective imitation is guided by the contents of a model’s mental states. In this view, infants are 
more likely to imitate the unusual action, which the model freely chooses to perform, in order to 
figure out why the model acts in this peculiar way (Buttelmann et al., 2008).  
To summarize, according to rational-imitation accounts, infants hold expectations on how 
the model should perform a specific action. If infants’ expectations are violated, this results in 
increased imitation of the observed unusual action (here: head touch). Infants either imitate the 
unusual action because they assume this to have an advantage and be the most efficient means 
(teleological) or because they want to learn the reason why the model performed this action 
(mentalistic).  
On the other hand, non-rational imitation accounts have been brought forward relating 
infants’ selective imitation to more basic, low-level processes such as motor resonance or 
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attention (Beisert et al., 2012; Paulus, Hunnius, Vissers, & Bekkering, 2011a, 2011b). The two-
stage model of infant imitation argues that two factors guide infants’ imitation: First, as action 
observation and action execution are automatically linked (i.e., motor resonance), infants are 
more likely to imitate actions that are already represented in their own motor repertoire and 
hence, elicit high motor resonance (Paulus, Hunnius, & Bekkering, 2013; Paulus et al., 2011a). 
Second, salient action effects influence infants’ imitative behavior in such actions eliciting 
effects (e.g., lamp lightens up) are imitated more than actions without effects (e.g., no light 
effect). In that perspective, infants need to physically support themselves by putting their hands 
on the table to turn on the lamp with their heads, similar to the adult model in the hands-free but 
not the hands-occupied condition (Paulus et al., 2011b). Consequently, only the demonstration in 
the hands-free condition elicited motor resonance and was thus imitated (for an evaluation of this 
account, see Buttelmann & Zmyj, 2012).  
Finally, Beisert et al. (2012) proposed that selective imitation occurs because of 
differences in perceptual distraction and, thus, attention. Accordingly, the authors claim that 
infants were distracted by the unusual look of the blanket being wrapped around the model’s 
torso and, therefore, imitated less in the hands-occupied condition (for findings inconsistent with 
this interpretation, see Buttelmann, Schieler, Wetzel, & Widmann, 2017; Elsner, Pfeifer, Parker, 
& Hauf, 2013; Kolling, Óturai, & Knopf, 2014). Both of these low-level non-rational imitation 
accounts differ from rational-imitation accounts in that infants’ expectations about how a model 
should usually turn on a lamp do not play a role.  
Non-rational imitation accounts might underestimate the pivotal role of violation of 
expectation (VOE) in infants’ learning as infants take unexpected events as unique opportunities 
to learn. For instance, 11-month-olds learned better after observing an object that violated a 
ERP EVIDENCE FROM THE HEAD-TOUCH PARADIGM 7 
physical core principle (e.g., a car that drove through a wall) and showed increased information-
seeking and hypothesis-testing behavior (Stahl & Feigenson, 2015). Accordingly, researchers 
investigating the orienting response (OR) have suggested that the repeated presentation of a 
certain action/stimulus leads to a higher expectation of the occurrence of that action/stimulus. If 
forthcoming actions/stimuli deviate from the established representation, an OR is elicited 
indicating the detection of a mismatch. The OR amplifies processing of the attended 
action/stimulus (Kavsek, 2012; Sokolov, 1963, 1990). Consequently, when observing unusual 
action outcomes, infants show signs of increased attention, e.g. longer looking times or increased 
pupil dilation (Gergely, Nádasdy, Csibra, & Bíró, 1995; Gredebäck & Melinder, 2010). It follows 
that enhanced attention, in response to unexpected actions, may influence imitative behavior 
leading to an increase in imitation frequency.  
A suitable method to investigate preverbal infants’ attention and action expectations is 
electroencephalography (EEG). Recent electrophysiological evidence suggests that 12- to 14-
month-old infants show increased motor activation, measured via a reduction in mu power, for 
the unexpected head-action condition compared to the expected hand-action condition in an 
adaptation of the head-touch paradigm (Langeloh et al., 2018). In line with the predictive 
processing framework (Kilner, Friston, & Frith, 2007), this effect was interpreted as reflecting 
infants’ updating of their prior action predictions after observing unexpected actions leading to 
prediction errors (for similiar effects in eating actions, see Stapel, Hunnius, van Elk, & 
Bekkering, 2010). Beyond analyzing oscillatory responses in the EEG, event-related potentials 
(ERPs) have a high temporal resolution and consist of well-defined components associated with 
specific cognitive processes (Luck, 2005). To move the debate concerning infants’ selective 
imitation forward, we measured their ERP responses to modeled actions to shed light on the 
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underlying neuronal mechanisms. We focused on two well-known ERP components in particular: 
the N400 and the Negative central (Nc). 
The N400 component has been associated with the violation of semantic context. For 
instance, the N400 amplitude is sensitive to linguistic manipulations that are semantically 
incongruent with, or unrelated to, specific task content (for a review, see Kutas & Federmeier, 
2011). Related N400-like effects have been found for incongruent words in picture-word priming 
paradigms in 14- and 19-month-olds (Friedrich & Friederici, 2005a, 2005b). Even younger 
infants have responded with N400-like components to incongruent word picture pairs in an 
advanced language production subgroup (Friedrich & Friederici, 2010) or when infants’ mothers 
verbally labeled the stimuli (Parise & Csibra, 2012). Research with adults indicates that language 
and action processing have similar neural mechanisms and underlying brain structures (Iacoboni, 
2005). In line with this notion, action understanding at 9 months of age has been linked to 
language production at 18 months (Kaduk et al., 2016). Thus, the N400 component is also 
sensitive to actions that violate contextual expectations, such as combing one’s hair with a 
toothbrush (Balconi & Caldiroli, 2011) or putting an empty spoon in one’s mouth (Reid & 
Striano, 2008) (for a review on N400 in action contexts, see Amoruso et al., 2013). 
There is limited but consistent evidence linking the N400 amplitude to the detection of 
unexpected action outcomes in infants, given the action context. Reid et al. (2009) conducted a 
study assessing the N400 component across development in 7- and 9-month-olds as well as 
adults. Participants were presented with short picture stories consisting of three images. The first 
image represented the action context (e.g., a person holding a pretzel). The second image 
illustrated the action initiation (e.g., the person opens his or her mouth while looking at the 
pretzel). Finally, the third image demonstrated either an expected action outcome (e.g., the 
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pretzel in the person’s mouth) or an unexpected action outcome (e.g., the pretzel at the person’s 
ear). The first two images served as prompts to build up expectations, which were either violated 
or not by the third image, presenting the action outcome. An N400-like component was elicited 
in response to the unexpected outcomes in 9-month-olds and adults but not in 7-month-olds. 
Thus, 9-month-old infants anticipated action outcomes via semantic processing systems, similar 
to adults (Kaduk et al., 2016; Reid et al., 2009).  
Further, 7- and 9-month-old infants discriminated between unexpected and expected 
action outcomes on an attentional level, indicated by an increased amplitude of the Nc 
component in response to expected eating outcomes (Kaduk et al., 2016; Reid et al., 2009). The 
Nc component is thought to index the amount of attentional engagement towards a stimulus 
(Reynolds, 2015; Reynolds & Richards, 2005). The direction of this effect is surprising with 
regard to the OR theory, which would rather predict that a mismatch between observed and 
expected actions should lead to an increase in attention, and, therefore, an increased Nc 
amplitude in response to the unexpected outcome. Reid et al. (2009) interpreted the increased 
amplitude of the Nc component in terms of successful food consumption, being highly salient 
and relevant for infants from an evolutionary point of view.  
To summarize, two distinct processes can be measured on a neural level while observing 
unexpected action outcomes: the Nc (attention) and the N400 (semantic). Increased Nc 
amplitude is associated with a low-level mismatch detection and consequent orienting response 
(Vaughan Jr & Kurtzberg, 1992) and, thus, more allocation of attention towards the unexpected 
outcome (Reynolds & Richards, 2017; Richards, Reynolds, & Courage, 2010). In comparison, 
the N400-like component is related to a more sophisticated processing of semantic violations, in 
response to unexpected action outcomes (Amoruso et al., 2013; Kutas & Federmeier, 2011). 
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However, the cognitive mechanisms underlying infants’ selective imitation are not yet clear. 
Contradicting rational- and non-rational imitation accounts have been proposed. Rational-
imitation accounts imply that infants hold expectations about others’ goal-directed actions which 
are violated in response to head-touch outcomes in the hands-free condition. Expectancy 
violations could then induce heightened attention, potentially supporting the learning of new 
actions through selective imitation. Yet, no study has directly investigated the neural processes 
underlying efficient and inefficient action observation, using ERPs in infants, that arise through 
situational constraints. 
Present study 
In the present study we aimed to elucidate the neural mechanisms underlying the 
observation of unexpected head-touch actions in an adaptation of the head-touch paradigm 
(Gergely et al., 2002; Langeloh et al., 2018; Zmyj et al., 2009). In Experiment 1 we explored 
whether, in accordance with rational-imitation accounts, infants’ brains respond to unusual head-
touch actions (hands-free, 12- to 14-month-olds) with VOE. In Experiment 2 (hands-restrained, 
12- to 14-month-olds), we assessed whether this effect was context-dependent. Lastly, in 
Experiment 3 (hands-free, 9-month-olds), we examined whether the developmental onset of the 
underlying neural mechanisms was similar to the behavioral onset of selective imitation.  
Experiment 1: hands-free, 12- to 14-month-olds 
In Experiment 1, while measuring EEG, we presented 12- to 14-month-old infants with 
short video sequences of adult models demonstrating that their hands were free. Following action 
outcomes showed the same adult model either turning on a lamp or a soundbox with their hand 
(hand-touch condition) or their head (head-touch condition). If infants experience a VOE while 
observing an inefficient head touch, we expect an N400-like component in response to the 
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unexpected action outcome only and not to the expected outcome (i.e., hand touch) (Kaduk et al., 
2016; Reid et al., 2009). Second, we hypothesized an Nc component in both conditions, with 
increased amplitude in response to the unexpected head touch compared to the more familiar and 
thus expected hand touch (in line with OR theory, Sokolov, 1963; Sokolov, 1990).  
Methods 
Participants. 
Infants in all studies were recruited from a midsized XXX [Nationality blinded for 
review] city and surrounding areas. They were from middle-class backgrounds, born full-term 
(37 – 41 weeks of gestation), Caucasian, and without any known neurological problems. In 
Experiment 1 the final sample consisted of twenty-two 12- to 14-month-old infants (11 girls, M 
age = 13 months 2 days, SD = 23 days, age range = 12 months 5 days to 14 months 24 days). 
Another 30 infants were tested but had to be excluded from the final sample due to fussiness 
(i.e., infants moved extensively or started crying before being presented with a required number 
of trials; 14 infants), failure to provide the minimum number of 10 artifact-free trials per 
condition despite completing a high number of trials (15 infants), or unsatisfactory contact of the 
reference electrodes (i.e., very spiky signal of all electrode channels; 1 infant). This attrition rate 
(about 58 %) is within the typical range for visual infant EEG studies of 50 – 75% (DeBoer, 
Scott, & Nelson, 2007; Hoehl & Wahl, 2012; Stets, Stahl, & Reid, 2012). Informed verbal and 
written consent were obtained from each participant’s parent before conducting the experiment. 
Infants received a certificate with their photo for participation. All experimental procedures were 
approved by the ethics committee of XXX [blinded for review] (reference 3752-04/13).  
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Stimuli. 
Infants were presented with video clips and photographs showing adult models 
performing head or hand actions (adapted from Gergely et al., 2002; Zmyj et al., 2009). Two 
different types of videos were used. To establish context and motivation at the beginning of the 
experiment, infants watched two pre-demonstration videos showing a female or a male adult 
sitting at a table demonstrating that their hands were free or restrained. Each participant watched 
both videos, in randomized order, establishing the models’ sex and situational constraints.  
Next, demonstration-phase video trials illustrated an action context depicting one of four 
adult models (two males, two females; different actors than in the pre-demonstration videos) 
sitting at a table with a touch-sensitive light in front of them. A line of duct tape was visible on 
the table but the model’s hands were clearly free (hands-free). Subsequent test frames depicted 
either expected (turning on the lamp using the hand) or unexpected action outcomes (turning on 
the lamp using the head) (Figure 1). In half of the trials, a round lamp (12 cm diameter) mounted 
on a black box (27 x 20 x 6 cm) was illuminated while the model was touching it (Gergely et al., 
2002; Meltzoff, 1988). To increase infants’ attention towards the presentation, in the other half of 
trials a toy-squeezing sound was generated by a blue and green soundbox (i.e., toy that makes a 
sound when being touched) (13 x 13 x 11.5 cm) while the model was touching it (similar to 
Buttelmann et al., 2007). The sound was presented with a maximum intensity of 75 dB. In the 
test frames, the lamp was presented with a size of 4.6 x 8.4 cm (visual angle of 4.79° x 8.73°) 
and the soundbox with a size of 4 x 4.5 cm (visual angle of 4.17° x 4.69°). The model was 
presented on screen with a width of approximately 9.13 cm (visual angle of 9.49°) and a height 
of 10.34 cm (visual angle of 10.74°) measured from head to table. We balanced the test frames 
for brightness and contrast with Adobe Photoshop CS4 extended (all ps > .05).  
ERP EVIDENCE FROM THE HEAD-TOUCH PARADIGM 13 
Procedure. 
During EEG recording, infants sat on their parent’s lap in a dimly lit testing area in front 
of a 75 Hz 19-inch stimulus monitor with a viewing distance of about 55 cm. The testing area 
was separated from the rest of the laboratory by dark blue room dividers to minimize infants’ 
distraction. Parents were instructed not to interact with their infant during data collection. The 
experiment consisted of one block of a maximum of 120 trials (60 hand-touch and 60 head-touch 
outcomes). The videos were displayed in semi-randomized order via the software Presentation 
(Neurobehavioral Systems, Albany, USA) with the constraint that the same modality 
(light/sound), gender (male/female) or outcome (hand touch/head touch) was not presented three 
times consecutively and that all 16 possible combinations (light/sound, head touch/hand touch, 
for each of the four models) were displayed within the first 48 trials. In addition, equal numbers 
of hand and head actions were used as the first trial stimulus to avoid a systematic confounding 
effect of the first observed action type. 
Figure 1 illustrates examples of the stimulus presentation sequence in which the model 
turns on the light or produces a sound by using either his or her hand or head. Every trial started 
with a central attractor (white star on black background) for an average of 1000 ms to attract 
infants’ attention to the screen. The subsequent video sequence depicted the model showing that 
their hands were free (by wiggling them) for 5000 ms, followed by a blank screen presented for a 
random period between 800 and 1000 ms. Lastly, the test frame demonstrating a hand- or head-
touch outcome was presented for 1500 ms. Each trial lasted 8500 ms leading to a maximum total 
testing time of 17 min. Whenever an infant became tired or fussy, the experimenter paused the 
presentation and resumed the experiment when the infant was in a calm and attentive state again. 
The session ended when the infant’s attention could no longer be directed to the presentation or 
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when the infant completed all the trials. EEG activity was recorded continuously and infants 
were video-recorded throughout the experiment for offline coding of looking behavior.  
EEG Recording and Analyses. 
EEG was recorded with an ActiCap System (Brain Products, Gilching, Germany) with 
 32 active silver/silver chloride (Ag/AgCl) electrodes arranged according to the 10-10 system 
and a right mastoid reference. Sampling rate was set at 250 Hz and the EEG signal was amplified 
via a BrainAmp amplifier (Brain Products, Gilching, Germany). Horizontal and vertical 
electrooculograms were recorded bipolarly. Impedances were controlled at the beginning of the 
experiment and accepted when below 20 kΩ.  
For additional EEG data editing, BrainVision Analyzer 2 (Brain Products, Gilching, 
Germany) was used. Offline filters were set from 0.3 to 30 Hz to remove frequencies not related 
to cortical processing and data were re-referenced to the average mastoids (TP9, TP10). Data 
were scanned for artifacts with an automatic artifact detection algorithm implemented in 
BrainVision Analyzer 2. Data were automatically excluded if the amplitude of the channels of 
interest (F3, Fz, F4, C3, Cz, C4, P3, Pz, P4) exceeded a voltage threshold of 200 µV within a 200 
ms interval (Michel, Wronski, Pauen, Daum, & Hoehl, 2017). Data were then segmented into 
epochs that comprised 200 ms before stimulus onset of the test frame to 1500 following stimulus 
onset. Infants’ behavior was video-coded and only trials in which infants did not blink and paid 
attention during the presentation of the test frame were included in further analyses. An 
independent rater blind to hypotheses coded 27 % of the behavioral videos. An excellent degree 
of inter-rater reliability was found between 446 measures with an average measure intraclass 
correlation of .99. EEG data were then baseline-corrected using 200 ms prior to the onset of the 
test frame and subsequently categorized as hand- or head-touch outcomes across lamp and sound 
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modality. Individual averages were computed for each of the two conditions. A minimum of 10 
artifact-free trials per condition was required for an infant to be included in the grand average. 
Each infant contributed 13 to 56 trials (M = 21.23, SD = 9.88) to the head-touch condition and 11 
to 56 trials (M = 19.18, SD = 9.81) to the hand-touch condition.  
The number of trials contributed to the head-touch condition (M = 21.23, SD = 9.88) was 
significantly higher than the number of trials contributed to the hand-touch condition (M = 19.18, 
SD = 9.81), t(21) = 2.045, p = .001. However, a subsequent F-test indicated that variances of the 
measured ERP components did not differ significantly between conditions, F(21,20) = 0.567, p 
> .05. Thus, trial numbers were not artificially reduced to the level of the other condition 
(Peykarjou, Pauen, & Hoehl, 2014).  
To compare head- and hand-touch conditions statistically on the ERP components of 
interest, two-way, repeated measures analysis of variances (rmANOVA) or t-tests were 
conducted with the within-subjects factor condition (hand touch, head touch). Greenhouse-
Geisser corrections for non-sphericity and Bonferroni corrections were employed if applicable 
for conservative corrections. The significance level was set to p = .05 (two-tailed) for all 
statistical analyses.  
Results 
Time windows and electrodes of interest were selected based on visual inspection and 
previous research (Kaduk et al., 2016; Michel, Kaduk, Ni Choisdealbha, & Reid, 2017; Reid et 
al., 2009). Grand averages of the electrode channels of interest (F3, Fz, F4, C3, Cz, C4, P3, Pz, 
P4) are displayed in Figure 2. Relevant components were most pronounced on central channels 
(C3, Cz, C4). 
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Nc. 
Across all trials a negative deflection in the mid-latency range was observed on central 
channels (C3, Cz, C4). This negative deflection is commonly referred to as the Nc component 
and is thought to indicate the amount of attentional engagement towards a stimulus (Reynolds, 
2015). Visual inspection indicated an effect of condition on the Nc, as the negativity amplitude 
was greater for head-touch outcomes in comparison to hand-touch outcomes (see Figure 2A for 
grand averages). In line with other studies investigating this waveform (Kaduk et al., 2016; 
Michel, Kaduk, et al., 2017; Reid et al., 2009), we analyzed mean amplitude differences on the 
Nc component in a time window between 400 and 600 ms. 
A paired t-test indicated significantly greater negativity for central electrodes in response 
to head-touch outcomes (M = -20.57, SD = 10.86) compared to hand-touch outcomes (M = -
16.23 µV, SD = 10.68 µV), t(21) = 2.470, p = .022, 95%CI [-7.99 µV, -0.69 µV], d = 0.53. 
Means and standard deviations of the Nc mean amplitude for single central channels in both 
conditions are reported in supplementary material 1. Thus, we found greater negativity on central 
electrode positions in the head-touch condition likely indicating increased allocation of attention 
during the observation of unexpected action outcomes.  
N400. 
Following the Nc component, a clear negative peak was observed indicating an N400-
like component on central channels (C3, Cz, C4). This was observed in a much more salient way 
for the head-touch condition (see Figure 2A for grand averages). As a defined peak of interest 
was predominantly present in only one condition, we applied the windows analysis technique by 
Hoormann, Falkenstein, Schwarzenau, and Hohnsbein (1998) (see also Kaduk et al., 2016; 
Michel, Kaduk, et al., 2017; Reid et al., 2009). The window analysis technique extracts values of 
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the amplitude of the ERP wave within a chosen time window at several time points for both 
conditions and compares conditions in a rmANOVA, with condition and time as within-subjects 
factors. A significant interaction between time and condition reveals that ERP waves differ in 
their morphology. For the window analysis, we chose a time window of 736 to 868 ms after 
stimulus-onset, very similar to previous studies on action understanding (Kaduk et al., 2016; 
Reid et al., 2009). In the present study the time course of the N400-like component was shorter 
than in previous studies, which conducted the analysis with 17 time windows (Kaduk et al., 
2016; Reid et al., 2009). However, we included only 12 time windows to appropriately analyze 
the current ERP waveforms. Consequently, a 2 x 12 rmANOVA with the within-subjects factors 
condition (hand touch, head touch) and time (12 samples at one sample per 12 ms) was 
performed. The rmANOVA revealed the critical significant interaction of condition and time, 
F(3.22,67.67) = 2.862, p = .040, h2p = 0.120. In addition, a significant main effect of time, 
F(3.16,66.362) = 7.068, p < .001, h2p = 0.252 was found indicating that across conditions ERP 
amplitudes differed between time windows. The analysis yielded no significant main effect of 
condition, F(1,21) = 0.230, p = .636. Thus, waveforms differed significantly between brain 
responses to expected hand-touch outcomes and unexpected head-touch outcomes. The variation 
of the ERP amplitude within the tested time window was only present in the head-touch 
condition indicating an N400-like response towards unexpected action outcomes (see Figure 2B).  
Discussion 
Results of Experiment 1 are in line with our hypothesis that infants would experience a 
VOE when observing an unusual and inefficient head touch while the models’ hands were free. 
We first showed that 12- to 14-month-olds discriminated between expected hand-touch and 
unexpected head-touch actions with differences on the Nc component. The increased Nc 
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amplitude in response to the unusual head touch might indicate an OR, a fast mismatch detection 
(Sokolov, 1963, 1990; Vaughan Jr & Kurtzberg, 1992). Second, the N400-like response to the 
unusual head touch implies that infants had difficulties in integrating the action outcome into the 
semantic action context (Reid et al., 2009).  
Our results suggest that infants were surprised when observing an unusual head action. 
However, it is important to test whether they take the action context into account, especially the 
action constraints posed on the model that proved critical in previous behavioral research on 
selective imitation (i.e., restrained hands) (Gergely et al., 2002; Zmyj et al., 2009). In Experiment 
2 we therefore changed the action context to rule out unspecific OR and VOE responses to head-
touch actions irrespective of situational action constraints.  
Experiment 2: hands-restrained, 12- to 14-month-olds 
In Experiment 2 we presented an additional sample of 12- to 14-month-old infants with 
the same stimuli as in Experiment 1 (hands-free, 12-month-olds) with the only difference that we 
changed the context such that the model’s hands were taped to the table (hands-restrained). 
Stimuli were adapted from Zmyj et al. (2009), which demonstrated that 12-month-olds imitated 
the head touch significantly more in the hands-free condition compared to the hands-restrained 
condition. If infants’ brains consider the action context when evaluating the outcomes in this 
scenario, we would not expect an increased Nc component or N400-like components in response 
to the head touch. Rather, a VOE would be expected in response to hand-touch actions, as it 
would be physically impossible to use the hands when they are restrained.  
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Methods 
Participants. 
Twenty 12- to 14-month-old infants (9 girls, M age = 12 months 25 days, SD = 22 days, 
age range = 12 months 1 day to 14 months 29 days) were included in the final sample. Another 
47 infants were tested but had to be excluded from the final sample due to fussiness (18 infants), 
failure to provide the minimum number of 10 artifact-free trials per condition (24 infants), 
unsatisfactory contact of the reference electrodes (3 infants) or technical/experimental errors (2 
infants). This attrition rate (about 70 %) is high but still within the typical range for infant EEG 
studies of 50 – 75% (DeBoer et al., 2007; Hoehl & Wahl, 2012; Stets et al., 2012).  
Stimuli. 
Infants were presented with the same two pre-demonstration videos as in Experiment 1 
showing a female or a male demonstrating that their hands were free or restrained. Stimuli of the 
demonstration phase were also identical to Experiment 1 except for the action context: the hands 
of the adult model were now tied to the table with duct tape and could not be moved freely (in 
adaptation to the hands-restrained condition by Zmyj et al., 2009). Consequently, infants 
observed an adult model demonstrating that his or her hands were restrained in each trial. 
Subsequent test frames depicted the model turning on the lamp or soundbox either by head or by 
hand (Figure 3). Again, we presented infants with sound and lamp stimuli to keep infants 
interested in the presentation (for more details, see Experiment 1). We balanced the test frames 
for brightness and contrast with Adobe Photoshop CS4 extended (all ps > .05).  
Procedure and EEG Recording and Analyses. 
Both the procedure and EEG and statistical analyses were identical to Experiment 1. 
Infants’ looking behavior was reliability-coded by an independent rater, blind to hypotheses. For 
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25 % of the videos, a high degree of inter-rater reliability was found between 319 measurements 
with an average measure intraclass correlation of .71. Each infant contributed 10 to 34 trials (M = 
17.25, SD = 5.87) to the head-touch condition and 10 to 34 trials (M = 16.05, SD = 5.45) to the 
hand-touch condition. The number of trials contributed to the final analysis did not differ 
significantly between conditions, t(19) = 1.447, p = .164. 
Results 
The morphology of the components of interest was highly comparable to Experiment 1. 
Thus, the same time windows and electrodes were chosen in Experiment 2. Grand averages of 
the electrode channels of interest (F3, Fz, F4, C3, Cz, C4, P3, Pz, P4) are displayed in Figure 4.  
Nc. 
Visual inspection indicated a negative deflection on central channels – the Nc component 
– in both conditions (see Figure 4A). Thus, the mean amplitude of the Nc component was 
assessed on central electrode channels (C3, Cz, C4) in a time window between 400 and 600 ms 
after stimulus onset. Again, we conducted a paired t-test, which revealed no significant 
difference between head- (M = -19.90 µV, SD = 17.13) and hand-touch outcomes (M = -19.35 
µV, SD = 16.11), t(19) = -.141, p = .889. Means and standard deviations of the Nc mean 
amplitude for single central channels, in both conditions, are reported in supplementary material 
2. We reasoned that infants’ initial action expectations, of the models using their heads to operate 
the lamp and soundbox may have been overwritten by repeatedly observing them using their 
hands, despite being restrained by the duct tape. To examine this idea, we performed the same 
analysis on the Nc component for the first half of presented trials only. Infants contributed 4 to 
12 valid trials (M = 7.74, SD = 2.28) to the head-touch condition and 5 to 14 trials (M = 7.87, SD 
= 2.32) to the hand-touch condition. No significant differences were found between head- (M = -
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22.67, SD = 19.91) and hand-touch outcomes (M = -23.13, SD = 19.33), t(19) = -.105, p = .918. 
Thus, when the model’s hands were restrained infants did not seem to discriminate between 
head- and hand-touch conditions with regard to the negative component thought to reflect 
attentional engagement.  
N400. 
Although Experiment 1 and previous literature (e.g., Kaduk et al., 2016; Reid et al., 
2009) suggest an N400-like component in response to unexpected action outcomes, no evidence 
for an N400-like component was observed in Experiment 2. This includes both the expected and 
the unexpected conditions (see Figure 4A). To verify the visual inspection we applied the 
windows analysis technique of Hoormann et al. (1998) with 12 time points in a time window of 
736 – 868 ms post stimulus onset. We conducted a 2 x 12 rmANOVA with the within-subjects 
factors condition (head touch, hand touch) and time (12 samples at one sample per 12 ms). A 
significant time x condition interaction would indicate differences in morphology between 
conditions. The rmANOVA yielded no significant interaction between time and condition, 
F(4.02,76.32) = .498, p = .738, and no main effect of time, F(2.83,53.69) = 1.023, p = .387 or 
condition, F(1,19) = .647, p = .431. In sum, the ERP waveforms in Experiment 2 did not differ in 
morphology, suggesting that infants did not distinguish the two action outcomes on a semantic 
level (see Figure 4B).  
Discussion 
Contrary to our expectations, in Experiment 2 infants neither discriminated between 
hand- and head-touch action outcomes in terms of attentional engagement nor on a semantic 
level. One explanation why this effect was not found in the present study is that infants may not 
have noticed the restraining duct tape due to a lack of visual salience. Alternatively, they may not 
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have understood the constraining nature of the tape on the model’s actions. However, both 
explanations are quite unlikely as Zmyj et al. (2009) demonstrated that 12-month-olds imitated 
selectively using the same external physical constraint, also presented via computer. Further, if 
infants did not notice or understand the consequences of the duct tape, results should have been 
similar to Experiment 1 (hands-free, 12- to 14-month-olds). Thus, even though results of 
Experiment 2 deviate from our hypotheses, they show that infants’ VOE response towards 
unusual head-touch outcomes is rather context-dependent and does not reflect a general response 
towards an unusual head-touch action.  
At this point we conclude that 12- to 14-month-old infants experience VOE when 
observing an unusual head touch, but only when the hands are free. We conducted Experiment 3 
to explore the developmental onset of infants’ action expectations in the head-touch paradigm.  
Experiment 3: hands-free, 9-month-olds 
In Experiment 3 we tested infants at the age of 9 months with the same paradigm as in 
Experiment 1 (hands-free, 12- to 14-month-olds). Zmyj et al. (2009) demonstrated that 12- but 
not 9-month-old infants considered non-voluntary, physical restraints (i.e., hands are tied to the 
table) when selectively imitating unusual head-touch actions. However, previous research 
suggests that 9-month-olds possess a quite sophisticated action understanding (Gredebäck & 
Daum, 2015), being able to predict and evaluate action outcomes based on their efficiency (e.g., 
eating actions Gredebäck & Melinder, 2010; Kaduk et al., 2016; Reid et al., 2009). We aimed to 
elucidate whether neural processing of unusual actions in the head-touch paradigm develops 
earlier than explicit selective imitation behavior. If 9-month-olds also experience VOE in 
response to the unusual head touch, in a hands-free condition, we should observe an increased 
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Nc amplitude and an N400-like component in response to the head- compared to the hand-touch 
action.  
Methods 
Participants. 
In Experiment 3, the final analysis was comprised of the data of twenty-three 9-month-
old infants (15 girls, M age = 9 months 16 days, SD = 8 days, age range = 9 months 0 days to 9 
months 28 days). An additional 51 infants were not included in the final analysis due to fussiness 
(26 infants), failure to provide the minimum number of 10 artifact-free trials per condition (19 
infants), unsatisfactory contact of the reference electrodes (4 infants) or technical error (2 
infants). This exclusion rate (about 69 %) is still within the typical range for infant EEG studies 
of 50 – 75% (DeBoer et al., 2007; Hoehl & Wahl, 2012; Stets et al., 2012).  
Stimuli and Procedure and EEG Recording and Analyses. 
The stimuli and procedure as well as EEG recordings and statistical analyses were 
identical to Experiment 1. A second coder, blind to the purpose of this study, coded 26 % of the 
videos for infants’ looking behavior. The inter-rater reliability between 384 measurements was 
high with an average measure intraclass correlation of .92. The final analyses consisted of 10 to 
20 trials (M = 13.91, SD = 2.97) in the head-touch condition and 10 to 23 trials (M = 12.91, SD = 
3.26) in the hand-touch condition. The number of trials infants contributed to the final analysis 
did not differ significantly between conditions, t(22) = 1.294, p = .209.  
Results 
The morphology of the components of interest was highly similar to Experiment 2 
(hands-restrained, 12- to 14-month-olds). For comparability, the same time windows and 
electrodes were chosen in Experiment 3. Grand averages of the electrode channels of interest 
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(F3, Fz, F4, C3, Cz, C4, P3, Pz, P4) are displayed in Figure 5. According to visual inspection, 
existing literature (Kaduk et al., 2016; Reid et al., 2009) and results of Experiment 1 and 2, 
components were analyzed on central channels (C3, Cz, C4). 
Nc. 
The mean amplitude of the Nc component was assessed on central electrode channels 
(C3, Cz, C4) in a time window between 400 and 600 ms after stimulus onset (Figure 5A). We 
conducted a paired t-test revealing no significant differences between head- (M = -12.28 µV, SD 
= 16.13) and hand-touch outcomes (M = -12.45 µV, SD = 13.27), t(22) = -.050, p = .961. Means 
and standard deviations of the Nc mean amplitude for single central channels in both conditions 
are reported in supplementary material 3. We performed the same analysis on the Nc component 
for the first half of presented trials to determine whether we would find evidence for initial action 
expectations that might have vanished across the course of the experiment. Infants contributed 4 
to 15 valid trials (M = 9.65, SD = 2.87) to the head-touch condition and 6 to 13 trials (M = 9.10, 
SD = 2.25) to the hand-touch condition. Mean amplitude did not differ significantly between 
head- (M = -17.42, SD = 17.28) and hand-touch outcomes (M = -10.90, SD = 19.22), t(22) = 
1.329, p = .198. Taken together, infants did not respond differently to head-touch or hand-touch 
actions on the level of the Nc component and thus presumably allocated the same amount of 
attention towards both outcomes.  
N400. 
Based on Experiment 1 (hands-free, 12- to 14-month-olds) and the existing literature on 
9-month-olds action processing (e.g., Kaduk et al., 2016; Reid et al., 2009), we expected an 
N400-like component in response to the unexpected head touch. However, visual inspection did 
not provide any evidence for an N400-like component in any of the two conditions (see Figure 
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5A). To test for an N400 effect in the present sample, similar to Experiment 1 and Experiment 2, 
we conducted a 2 x 12 rmANOVA with the within-subjects factors condition (head touch, hand 
touch) and time (12 samples at one sample per 12 ms in a time window of 736 – 868 ms after 
stimulus onset). No time x condition interaction was found, F(3.887,85.512) = .246, p = .907. 
The statistical analysis did not reveal significant main effects (all other ps > .05). Thus, ERP 
waveforms of the head-touch and hand-touch outcomes did not differ in Experiment 3. No 
indication for an N400-like component was found (see Figure 5B).  
Discussion 
The results of Experiment 3 suggest that 9-month-old infants did not discriminate 
between the unusual head touch and the familiar hand touch on either an attentional or a 
semantic level. Our findings, with an adapted head-touch paradigm, are in line with behavioral 
evidence indicating that the developmental onset of selective imitation takes place between 9 and 
12 months of age (Zmyj et al., 2009). Still, our results are surprising with regard to the literature 
on early action understanding (Gredebäck & Daum, 2015). Actions in the current scenario may 
have been less familiar than eating actions in previous studies and were more difficult to evaluate 
for young infants.  
General Discussion 
While infants imitate selectively and show more frequent imitation of an unusual head 
action when the model’s hands are free, theoretical explanations differ with regard to the 
assumed level of infants’ cognitive abilities (Beisert et al., 2012; Buttelmann et al., 2007; 
Gergely et al., 2002; Paulus et al., 2011a, 2011b). Rational-imitation accounts posit that 1-year-
olds hold expectations about another person achieving a goal by the most efficient means. These 
expectations should be violated after observing an unusual or inefficient means to achieve a 
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desired action outcome. Non-rational imitation accounts do not make specific predictions about 
VOE effects and can, thus, neither be supported nor completely refuted in the current study. 
In the three experiments reported here we investigated infants’ electrophysiological 
responses in an adaptation of the well-established head-touch paradigm (Gergely et al., 2002; 
Zmyj et al., 2009). We analyzed the Nc and N400-like components associated with VOE, in 
particular attentional orienting and semantic processing, respectively. We predicted an increased 
Nc amplitude as well as an N400-like component for inefficient and unexpected action 
outcomes. Results revealed that 12- to 14- but not 9-month-olds show evidence for VOE when 
observing unexpected head-touch actions when the model’s hands are free, as indicated by an 
increased Nc amplitude and an N400-like component (Experiments 1 and 3). In contrast, 12- to 
14-month-old infants did not show an indication of VOE in response to head-touch actions when 
the model’s hands were restrained (Experiment 2).  
Previous research has associated the Nc component with the allocation of attentional 
engagement towards a stimulus (Reynolds, 2015). We found an increased Nc amplitude across 
central channels, between 400 and 600 ms, in response to the unexpected head touch compared 
to the expected hand touch, specifically when the models’ hands were free (Experiment 1: hands-
free, 12- to 14-month-olds). Thus, more attentional resources were used to process unexpected 
action outcomes. Both the topography of the Nc component and the latency are in accordance 
with literature on Nc effects in similar age groups (Kaduk et al., 2016; Reid et al., 2009; Webb, 
Long, & Nelson, 2005). However, previous ERP studies investigating eating actions have 
demonstrated increased Nc amplitudes in response to expected outcomes (food to the mouth) 
compared to unexpected outcomes (food to the head). Directing food to the mouth may have 
been of higher importance to infants than directing food to other parts of the head (Kaduk et al., 
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2016; Reid et al., 2009). In contrast, in the present case we interpret the increased Nc amplitude 
in response to unexpected action outcomes as reflecting an OR (Sokolov, 1963, 1990; Vaughan Jr 
& Kurtzberg, 1992). When observing an unexpected action and, thus, a stimulus that deviates 
from the prior action representation, a mismatch response occurs. The mismatch detection leads 
to increased attention, as indicated by an enhanced Nc amplitude. This process puts infants in a 
receptive state and sets up the preconditions for subsequent learning to take place when 
observing a head touch while the model’s hands are free.  
Our interpretation is in line with research on infants’ arithmetic knowledge, which has 
demonstrated a higher negativity on frontocentral channels in response to incorrect solutions of 
basic equations (e.g., 1 + 1 dolls = 2 dolls (correct) or = 1 doll (incorrect)). Berger, Tzur, and 
Posner (2006) explained the greater negativity in response to incorrect outcomes as error 
detection when perceiving expectancy violations, similar to the theory of the OR (Sokolov, 1963, 
1990). Infants in their first year of life seem to focus more on unusual or unexpected action 
outcomes possibly because they may learn from them. In line with the directed attention model 
(Reid & Striano, 2007), infants are able to identify actions from which they can acquire novel 
information within social contexts.  
Intriguingly, 12- to 14-month-olds did not only discriminate between the unexpected head 
touch and the expected hand touch on an attentional level but also processed the unexpected 
action on a semantic level as indicated by an N400-like component. The N400 component has 
been associated with constructing semantic meaning with previous experiences and contextual 
information in the language and action domain in adults (Amoruso et al., 2013; Kutas & 
Federmeier, 2011) and in infants (Friedrich & Friederici, 2004, 2006; Reid et al., 2009). In 
accordance with the latter work on infants, the N400-like response to unexpected head-touch 
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actions was delayed in time in the present study compared to adults’ N400 component. However, 
the localization of the N400-like component to central regions differs from that of previous 
infant studies on semantic action processing, which observed the component over parietal 
regions in 9-month-olds (Kaduk et al., 2016; Reid et al., 2009). A more frontally or centrally 
distributed N400 component could be related to less effortful processing and/or decreasing 
stimulus demand in 12- to 14-month-olds compared to younger infants. The central location of 
the N400-like component in the present study could thus indicate that the detection of a semantic 
violation is less demanding for 1-year-olds than for 9-month-olds, similar to adults (Bach, 
Gunter, Knoblich, Prinz, & Friederici, 2009; Wu & Coulson, 2005) and older children (Coch, 
Maron, Wolf, & Holcomb, 2002). The present results are also consistent with N400-like 
responses to eating actions (Kaduk et al., 2016; Reid et al., 2009). This implies that 1-year-old 
infants can even build up semantic action expectations for actions performed with novel objects 
(i.e., touch light and soundbox). Importantly, differences in neurophysiological responses 
towards action outcomes cannot be explained by low-level differences as we controlled for 
luminance and contrast and varied only whether the hand or the head touched the lamp.  
Detecting unexpected action outcomes involves quite sophisticated action understanding 
abilities (for an overview, see Gredebäck & Daum, 2015). Infants need to identify an agent and 
adjust their focus of attention within the direction of the other person. Further, infants need to 
build up action predictions by taking into the account agent, future goal states and contextual 
features. Finally, infants need to evaluate whether their action predictions are confirmed or 
violated after having observed an action outcome. We argue accordingly that the N400-like 
response towards the unexpected head touch in Experiment 1 indicates a surprise reaction after 
evaluating the rationality of the experimenters’ actions.  
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VOE responses in 12- to 14-month-olds may support their learning and enhance imitation 
behavior. This is in line with recent research demonstrating increased exploration and 
hypothesis-testing behavior in 11-month-olds, after observing objects behaving in an unexpected 
way (Stahl & Feigenson, 2015). Consequently, results of Experiment 1 are consistent with 
rational-imitation accounts (Buttelmann et al., 2008; Gergely et al., 2002): Based on the principle 
of rational action (Gergely & Csibra, 2003), infants assume that agents achieve a goal (here: 
turning on a lamp) by the most efficient means (here: hand). These expectations were violated 
when an inefficient action was performed (here: head). Whereas results of Experiment 1 fit 
neatly into previous research on early action understanding, findings of Experiment 2 (hands-
restrained, 12- to 14-month-olds) and 3 (hands-free, 9-month-olds) contrast with our 
expectations and some reports in the literature. In Experiment 2, when the model’s hands were 
restrained, 12- to 14-month-olds did not discriminate between head- and hand-touch outcomes 
on an attentional or semantic level.  
Several different explanations might account for this finding. First, infants may not have 
detected the restraining duct tape and therefore did not perceive the experimenter’s hands as 
being restrained at all. If that had been the case, however, we would have expected the same 
results as in Experiment 1, i.e. indices of VOE in response to the head touch. Second, it is 
possible that infants did in fact process the restrained hands, but the head touch was still more 
salient and caught infants’ attention. Supporting this idea, recent eye tracking data suggests that 
infants pay a similar, and substantial, amount of attention to a model’s head touch, irrespective of 
the situational constraints (Buttelmann et al., 2017). Third, across the course of the experiment, 
infants may have learned that both action outcomes (head or hand) are equally likely in this 
scenario. Yet, infants did not discriminate between action outcomes even within the first half of 
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observed trials. Hence, it seems unlikely that infants’ prior expectations were gradually 
overwritten by observing many repetitions of the same action. Finally, in Experiment 2 we did 
not measure VOE based on predictions of the principle of rationality (Gergely & Csibra, 2003), 
but rather on physical principles. Although past research suggests that infants understand basic 
physical principles from early on (Baillargeon, 2004; Spelke & Kinzler, 2007), applying this 
knowledge to a novel social context with unknown objects might have been too difficult. 
Alternatively, two distinct parallel processes might have cancelled each other out: 1) VOE for 
unusual head actions and 2) VOE for physically impossible hand actions. In sum, based on the 
data of Experiment 2, we suggest that VOE in response to the unusual head touch is context-
dependent as infants were not surprised in response to the head touch when the models’ hands 
were restrained (but they were surprised when the model’s hands were free, Experiment 1).  
In addition, 9-month-olds did not distinguish hand- and head-touch outcomes on an 
attentional or semantic level when the model’s hands were free (Experiment 3). Why did we not 
replicate results of previous studies on food consumption (Kaduk et al., 2016; Reid et al., 2009)? 
In the present case, actions and objects were novel and unknown and thus fundamentally 
different from feeding actions. Outcomes of eating actions, on the other hand, are highly familiar 
and might have been easier for infants to anticipate and evaluate, even at nine months of age. 
Alternatively, the action sequences in the present study might have challenged 9-month-olds’ 
working memory capacities (Ross-Sheehy, Oakes, & Luck, 2003). This could have inhibited 
semantic processing and, thus, rational evaluation of action outcomes. Reducing the stimulus 
complexity by only presenting action outcomes may reveal semantic action processing in the 
present paradigm even in 9-month-olds (Michel, Kaduk, et al., 2017). Finally, our preferred 
interpretation of Experiment 3 is that at the age of 9 months, infants are not actually surprised 
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when observing an unexpected head touch. This would be the case if they were unable to form 
action expectations that are generalizable to novel situations, such as the current paradigm. This 
is in accordance with behavioral studies showing that the developmental onset of selective 
imitation occurs between 9 and 12 months of age (Zmyj et al., 2009).  
The fact that we did not measure a behavioral outcome in the present study limits the 
conclusions we can draw about neural mechanisms of selective imitation itself. In order to fully 
understand the relation between neural mechanisms and imitation behavior, future research 
should focus on paradigms including both neurophysiological and behavioral measures (Köster, 
Langeloh, Kliesch, Kanngiesser, & Hoehl, 2019). Analyzing individual differences of the 
occurrence of the N400-like component (Kaduk et al., 2016) may provide additional insights 
about neural mechanisms discriminating between imitators and non-imitators. Further, adding 
the simultaneous application of eye tracking to the EEG recording could reveal information on 
predictive gaze shifts, pupil dilation, and looking time measures to further understand processes 
taking place while observing VOE in action contexts (Gredebäck & Melinder, 2010; Hunnius & 
Bekkering, 2010).  
To summarize overall, our data suggest that 12- to 14-month-olds experience VOE when 
observing unusual and inefficient head touches compared to more familiar and efficient hand 
touches. We found evidence for this both in terms of attentional orienting and semantic 
integration. However, the effect was restricted to conditions when the model’s hands were free 
(Experiment 1) as opposed to when their hands were restrained (Experiment 2). The increased 
Nc amplitude in response to the unusual head touch likely illustrates stronger attentional 
engagement and should put infants in a more receptive state. Such a state would influence 
learning and detection of a semantic violation, reflected by the subsequent N400-like component. 
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No discrimination between the unusual head touch and the familiar hand touch was found in 9-
month-olds (Experiment 3). Our results are in line with rational-imitation accounts suggesting 
the developmental onset of selective imitation occurs between 9 and 12 months of age.  
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Figures 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Stimulus examples of lamp (A) and sound (B) modality used for Experiment 1 (hands-
free, 12- to 14-month-olds) and Experiment 3 (hands-free, 9-month-olds). The model’s hands are 
free while turning on a lamp/soundbox using either his/her hand (expected) or head 
(unexpected). Models did not establish eye contact with infants. Action outcomes represent test 
frames used for ERP analyses. Persons appearing in this figure consented to the publication of 
these images.  
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Figure 2. A) Grand average ERP responses to hand- (blue) and head-touch (red) outcomes in 12- 
to 14-month-olds in Experiment 1. Statistical analyses on the Nc and N400-like component were 
conducted on central channels (C3, Cz, C4). Note that negative is plotted up. Asterisks depict 
significant differences with p < .05. B) Zoomed-in time window of interest (736 – 868 ms) with 
12 time points (each 12 ms) indicating an N400-like component in response to the head-touch 
outcomes but not to the hand-touch outcomes.  
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Figure 3. Stimulus examples of lamp (A) and sound (B) modality used for Experiment 2 (hands-
restrained, 12- to 14-month-olds). The model’s hands are tied to the table while turning on a 
lamp using either his/her hand (unexpected) or head (expected). Models did not establish eye 
contact with infants. Action outcomes represent test frames used for ERP analyses. Persons 
appearing in this figure consented to the publication of these images.  
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Figure 4. A) Grand average ERP responses to hand- (blue) and head-touch (red) outcomes in 12- 
to 14-month-olds in Experiment 2. Statistical analyses on the Nc and N400-like component were 
conducted on central channels (C3, Cz, C4). Note that negative is plotted up. B) Zoomed-in time 
window of interest (736 – 868 ms) with 12 time points (each 12 ms) indicating no N400-like 
component in response to either head-touch or hand-touch outcomes.  
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Figure 5. A) Grand average ERP responses to hand- (blue) and head-touch (red) outcomes in 9-
month-olds in Experiment 3. Statistical analyses on the Nc and N400-like component were 
conducted on central channels (C3, Cz, C4). Note that negative is plotted up. B) Zoomed-in time 
window of interest (736 – 868 ms) with 12 time points (each 12 ms) indicating no N400-like 
component in response to either head-touch or hand-touch outcomes.  
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Abstract 
From early on, infants evaluate other people’s actions. Past research suggests that infants 
distinguish expected from unexpected action outcomes with regard to attention allocation and 
semantic integration. Adults do not require context information to evaluate action outcomes 
semantically. Crucially, in previous studies, infants were presented with information concerning 
action context. Yet, little is known about the role of context information in infants’ action 
evaluation. In the absence of extra contextual information, we measured 12-month-old infants’ 
(N = 23) electrophysiological responses to expected hand- and unexpected head-touch action 
outcomes (i.e., a person turning on a lamp or a soundbox using her hand or head). Event-related 
potential components, associated with attentional engagement (Negative central; Nc) and 
semantic integration (N400), were analyzed. Infants responded with an increased negativity on 
the Nc component towards unexpected head-touch outcomes. No N400 component was observed 
for unexpected action outcomes. Thus, our data suggest that, in the absence of contextual 
information, one-year-olds discriminate between expected and unexpected outcomes in 
attentional but not semantic terms. In comparison to adults, infants may still require context 
information for semantic action processing. 
Keywords: action perception, infants, event-related potentials, Nc, N400 
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One-year-olds’ event-related potentials differentiate expected from unexpected action outcomes 
without context information 
 
When engaging in a social interaction, we constantly try to make sense of the other 
person’s actions in order to respond appropriately. This ability is highly complex, incorporating 
the evaluation of the other person’s action goal, the means to accomplish it, and the contextual 
information. In this respect, it is fascinating that infants within their first year of life begin to 
process and interpret other people’s actions (for overviews, see Ni Choisdealbha & Reid, 2014; 
Gredebäck & Daum, 2015).  
Infants’ action understanding has mainly been studied with behavioral paradigms, which 
suggest that at the age of 4 months infants are sensitive to unexpected action outcomes when 
contextual information is provided (Gredebäck & Melinder, 2011). In addition, 
neurophysiological studies examined cognitive processes underlying infants’ action 
understanding by analyzing oscillatory dynamics (Langeloh et al., 2018) and event-related 
potentials (ERPs; Langeloh, Buttelmann, Pauen, & Hoehl, 2019; Reid et al., 2009). Two ERP 
components related to the evaluation of unexpected action outcomes and thus, to the violation of 
expectation (VOE), have been brought forward. The Negative central (Nc) component is 
associated with the amount of attentional engagement (Reynolds, 2015), whereas the N400 
reflects the detection of violations of semantic action contexts (Amoruso et al., 2013). For 
example, in an adaptation of the head-touch paradigm (Gergely, Bekkering, & Király, 2002), 12- 
to 14-month-olds displayed VOE when observing an adult who performed an inefficient action 
(i.e., turning on a lamp with her head while her hands were free) (Langeloh et al., 2019). 
Specifically, infants showed an increased Nc amplitude as well as an N400-like component 
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during the unexpected actions (for similar N400 effects during unexpected eating actions, see 
Kaduk et al., 2016; Reid et al., 2009). 
Interestingly, adults are able to process semantic violations without receiving prompts 
concerning the action context (Michel, Kaduk, Ni Choisdealbha, & Reid, 2017; Mudrik, Lamy, 
& Deouell, 2010). Crucially, the previously discussed ERP-studies presented infants with 
information on the action context. Thus, this may have facilitated the detection of the unexpected 
action outcomes. Still, it remains unclear whether infants process action outcomes semantically, 
as adults do, when no contextual information is provided.  
In the current study we aimed to clarify the role of action context during the processing of 
action outcomes in infants and to replicate recent findings (Langeloh et al., 2019). We showed 
12-month-olds action outcomes that were demonstrated by adult models. The models turned on 
either a lamp or a soundbox with their hand (hand-touch condition) or their head (head-touch 
condition) while their hands were otherwise free. However, contextual information was not 
provided prior to each trial, as it was originally (Langeloh et al., 2019). That is, only the action 
outcome (expected or unexpected) was presented. If infants discriminate action outcomes in 
attentional terms, we expected an increased Nc amplitude for unexpected action outcomes 
compared to more familiar and expected action outcomes. Second, we hypothesized that – 
should infants experience VOE even without prior context information – their brains would 
respond with an N400 component in response to the unexpected action outcomes only. 
Methods  
Participants 
Required sample size (N = 22) was predetermined based on an a priori power analysis 
(G*Power: Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) given a level of significance of 0.05, a 
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power of 0.8, and an expected medium effect size of f = 0.25. The final sample consisted of N = 
23 infants (11 girls, M age = 12 months 11 days, SD = 8 days, age range = 12 months 1 day to 12 
months 29 days)1. Another N = 25 infants were tested but had to be excluded from the final 
sample because of failure to reach the minimum number of artifact-free trials per condition (n = 
18), bad data quality (n = 4), poor contact of the reference electrode (n = 2), or experimental 
error (n = 1). All infants were born full-term (37 – 41 weeks of gestation) and without any known 
neurological problems. Informed verbal and written consent were obtained from each 
participant’s parent. The experiment was carried out in line with institutional protocols and the 
Declaration of Helsiniki. The preregistration of this study can be accessed via 
https://aspredicted.org/tf6q4.pdf. 
Stimuli 
We presented infants with static images2 depicting action outcomes showing one of four 
adult models turning on a lamp or a soundbox (i.e., a toy that makes a sound when being 
touched) (Gergely et al., 2002; Buttelmann, Carpenter, Call, & Tomasello, 2007). Action 
outcomes were presented in an expected (i.e., using the hand) or in an unexpected manner (i.e., 
using the head). Figure 1 illustrates the complete stimulus set used in the present study. 
Whenever an action outcome of an adult touching the soundbox was shown, a toy-squeezing 
sound was generated at a maximum intensity of 65 dB. Stimuli were presented at the center of a 
60-Hz 17-inch monitor at a viewing distance of about 55 cm at a visual angle of 11.52° x 15.91°. 
Action outcomes were matched with Adobe Photoshop CS4 extended for luminance and contrast 
(all ps > .05).  
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Procedure 
During EEG recording infants sat on their parent’s lap in an electrically-shielded and 
sound-attenuated cabin. Parents were instructed not to interact with their infant during data 
collection. Infants’ electrical brain activity was measured in two within-subjects conditions, the 
hand-touch and the head-touch condition. The experiment consisted of one block of a maximum 
of 120 trials (60 hand-touch and 60 head-touch outcomes). The two conditions were presented in 
a semi-randomized order via the software Presentation (Neurobehavioral Systems, Albany, 
USA). The same outcome (hand touch/head touch), same modality (lamp/sound), and same sex 
(male/female) was not presented in more than two consecutive trials. All 16 possible action 
outcomes (head touch/hand touch, lamp/sound, for each of the four adults) were presented within 
the first 48 trials. Furthermore, we counterbalanced between infants whether the first action 
presented was a hand touch or a head touch to avoid a confounding effect of the first observed 
action type.  
Every trial started with an attention getter (900 – 1100 ms), followed by an expected or 
unexpected action outcome (1500 ms; see Figure 2 for an example of a trial sequence). 
Whenever the infant became fussy, the experimenter paused the experiment and resumed when 
the infant was in an attentive state again. The testing session ended when the infant’s attention 
could no longer be attracted to the screen or when the infant completed all the trials. EEG was 
recorded continuously during the experiment and infants’ behavior was video-recorded for 
offline coding of looking behavior.  
EEG Recording and Analyses 
EEG was recorded from 29 scalp locations according to the 10-20 system using Ag/AgCl 
ring electrodes and referenced online to Cz. Data were recorded with a Twente Medical Systems 
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32-channel REFA amplifier at a sampling rate of 500 Hz. Horizontal and vertical 
electrooculograms were recorded bipolarly. Impedances were controlled at the beginning of the 
experiment and accepted when below 10 kΩ. EEG data were preprocessed in Brain Vision 
Analyzer 2 (Brain Products, Gilching, Germany), in the same manner as in recent research 
(Langeloh et al., 2019). Offline filters were set from 0.3 to 30 Hz and data were re-referenced to 
the average mastoids (TP9, TP10). Data were automatically excluded if the amplitude of any 
channel exceeded a voltage threshold of 200 µV within a 200 ms interval. Data were time-locked 
to the action outcomes and thus segmented into epochs of waveforms that comprised 200 ms 
prior to 1500 ms after stimulus onset. Infants’ looking behavior was coded offline and only trials 
in which infants did not blink during the onset and watched the entire presentation of the action 
outcome were included in further analyses. An independent rater, blind to hypotheses, rated 26 % 
of the videos leading to a high inter-rater reliability of ICC = .93. For the baseline correction, we 
used the 200 ms before the stimulus onset. An individual average was calculated per participant 
across lamp and soundbox stimuli for each of the two within-subjects conditions (hand touch, 
head touch). Subsequently, grand averages were estimated across all subjects for each condition. 
A minimum of 10 artifact-free trials per condition was required for an infant to be included in the 
grand average. On average each infant contributed 10 to 43 trials (M = 23.34, SD = 9.61) to the 
head-touch condition and 10 to 41 trials (M = 22.04, SD = 10.12) to the hand-touch condition. 
The number of trials did not differ significantly between conditions, t(22) = 1.219, p = .236.  
For statistical analyses, two-way repeated measures analysis of variances (rmANOVA) or 
paired t-tests were conducted with the main within-subjects factor condition (hand touch, head 
touch). Greenhouse-Geisser correction was employed if applicable. The level of significance was 
set to 0.05 for all statistical analyses.  
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Results 
Following recent findings (Langeloh et al., 2019), components of interest were analyzed 
on central channels (C3, Cz, C4). Final analyses differed slightly from the preregistered analyses 
(see supplemental material for details and justification). Grand averages of frontocentral 
electrodes are displayed in Figure 3.  
Nc 
The mean amplitude of the Nc component was assessed on an average of central 
electrode channels (C3, Cz, C4) in a time window between 400 and 600 ms after stimulus onset, 
similar to Langeloh et al. (2019) (Figure 3). A paired t-test revealed significant differences 
between action outcomes with greater negativity in response to head-touch outcomes (M = -
18.44 µV, SD = 10.56) compared to hand-touch outcomes (M = -13.66 µV, SD = 12.30), t(22) = 
2.159, p = .042, 95 % CI [0.19 µV, 9.38 µV], d = .49. Means and standard deviations of the Nc 
mean amplitude for single frontocentral channels, in both conditions, are reported in Table 1. The 
greater negativity in response to head-touch actions suggests that infants allocated more attention 
towards unexpected action outcomes.  
N400 
Visual inspection did not indicate an N400-like component in response to head- or hand-
touch action outcomes (Figure 3). To statistically test for the possibility that ERP waves differ in 
morphology with an N400-like component being present in only one condition, we applied the 
windows analysis technique (Hoormann, Falkenstein, Schwarzenau, & Hohnsbein, 1998). We 
extracted amplitude values for several time points for both conditions and compared them in a 
rmANOVA with the within-subjects factors condition and time. A significant interaction between 
time and condition would indicate that the ERP waveform differed between conditions. We 
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conducted the same analysis across central channels (C3, Cz, C4) as in Langeloh et al. (2019) in 
a time window of 736 to 868 ms after stimulus onset by extracting 12 samples. The rmANOVA 
with the within-subjects factors condition (head touch, hand touch) and time (12 samples at one 
sample per 12 ms) revealed no significant interaction of condition and time, F(3.00,65.96) = 
1.684, p = .179. No main effects were found (all other ps > .05). In sum, ERP waveforms in the 
time window previously associated with an N400-like component did not differ between 
conditions. This suggests that infants did not distinguish head- from hand-touch action outcomes 
on a semantic level.  
Discussion 
In the present study, we aimed to elucidate whether 12-month-olds require context 
information to detect semantic violations in action outcomes. As hypothesized, infants responded 
with increased negativity on the Nc component towards unexpected head-touch outcomes (i.e., a 
person turning on a lamp or a soundbox using her head, although her hands were free). 
Replicating previous research (Langeloh et al., 2019), we suggest that the enhanced Nc 
amplitude indicates an orienting response triggered by a VOE. When observing an unexpected 
action outcome, a mismatch response occurs leading to increased attention (Sokolov, 1990; 
Vaughan Jr & Kurtzberg, 1992). Similarly, the N2 in adults, a potential successor of the Nc 
(Rothenberger, Banaschewski, Siniatchkin, & Heinrich, 2007; Vaughan Jr & Kurtzberg, 1992), 
has been associated with attended mismatch (Folstein & Van Petten, 2008).  
In contrast, no N400 component was observed for unexpected action outcomes. Hence, 
12-month-old infants, similar to 5-month-olds in past research (Michel et al., 2017), may not use 
semantic systems when observing action outcomes unless action context is presented beforehand. 
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Thus, prior information on action initiation and context may have facilitated infants’ semantic 
processing in previous studies (Kaduk et al., 2016; Reid et al., 2009; Langeloh et al., 2019). 
Our results support the idea that two distinct cognitive mechanisms may be involved in 
infants’ action processing: a fast discrimination on an attentional level (enhanced Nc amplitude) 
and a more specific mismatch processing on a semantic level (N400) (for a similar distinction in 
adults, see Szucs, Soltesz, Czigler, & Csepe, 2007). These mechanisms are not mutually 
exclusive. They may emerge from a rudimentary familiarity distinction (Michel et al., 2017) and 
develop to a discrimination in attentional terms in older infants, up to a full-fledged semantic 
action processing in adults. In future research, infants’ neural responses towards a broader range 
of actions should be tested across their first years of life and linked to behavioral outcomes, such 
as imitation scores (Filippi et al., 2016). 
To summarize, our data suggest that 1-year-olds discriminate between expected and 
unexpected action outcomes in attentional terms. Consequently, for a fast detection of unusual 
action outcomes, even in an unfamiliar situation such as the head-touch paradigm, infants do not 
need specific context information. A deeper semantic processing of unexpected actions may 
require prior information concerning action initiation and context. 
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Footnotes 
1During data acquisition we could only roughly estimate whether an infant might be 
included in the final analyses. Therefore, our final sample included one participant more than the 
a priori power analysis suggested. 
2To establish context at the beginning of the experiment before the presentation of action 
outcomes, infants were presented with two pre-demonstration videos showing a female or male 
adult sitting at a table demonstrating that their hands were free or restrained. Adult models were 
different actors than in the photographs depicting action outcomes during the experiment. Each 
infant watched two videos, in randomized order, establishing the models’ sex and situational 
constraints (for details, see Langeloh et al., 2019). 
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Tables 
Table 1 
Means (M) and standard deviations (SD) of the Nc amplitude for frontocentral electrodes 
  Head touch  Hand touch 
Electrode  M SD  M SD 
F3  -16.53 15.10  -10.98 13.48 
Fz  -15.30 13.96  -9.05 10.49 
F4  -18.50 13.97  -11.58 12.56 
C3  -18.64 13.10  -13.18 12.30 
Cz  -17.12 10.28  -13.31 13.49 
C4  -19.56 13.66  -14.48 15.51 
Note: Amplitude size is reported in µV. 
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Figures 
Figure 1. Complete stimulus sets showing four adult models (two males, two females) turning on 
A) a lamp or B) a soundbox with their hand (expected) or their head (unexpected). Persons 
appearing in this figure consented to the publication.  
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Figure 2. An example stimulus sequence presented to infants. From top left to bottom right: 
expected hand touch lamp (1500 ms), inter-stimulus-interval (900 – 1100 ms), unexpected head 
touch lamp (1500 ms), inter-stimulus-interval (900 – 1100 ms), expected hand touch soundbox 
(1500 ms). Persons appearing in this figure consented to the publication.  
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Figure 3. Grand average ERP responses to hand- (blue) and head-touch (red) outcomes in 12-
month-olds. Statistical analyses on the Nc and N400-like component were conducted on central 
channels (C3, Cz, C4). Note that negativity is plotted up. Asterisk depicts significant difference 
with p < .05. 
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